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ABSTRACT 
 
We compare acquisition activity, method of payment choice, and the long-run value 
implications of acquisitions by newly public single-class and dual-class US companies. Our 
results show that dual-class IPO firms make relatively more acquisitions in innovative industries 
and are less likely to pay with stock as compared to single-class IPO firms. We provide evidence 
that the reluctance of dual-class firms to pay with stock is not related to the insiders’ cash-flow 
rights but it is significantly positively related to the insiders’ voting rights and wedge between 
the insiders’ voting rights and cash-flow rights. We also find that acquiring dual-class IPOs 
perform better in the long-run than acquiring single-class IPO firms, and the better performance 
is mainly due to acquisitions in innovative industries. The results suggest that insiders of dual-
class IPOs try to retain control during subsequent M&A activities. The governance structure in 
such firms allows them to make investments in high risk projects that enhance shareholder value 
in the long-run. Next, we examine the acquisition performance of family and non-family firms in 
the S&P 500 universe. Using style-adjusted and market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns (BHAR) 
and controlling for firm and merger characteristics, we find that the post-merger performance of 
family firms is significantly better than that of non-family firms. In particular, the mean one-year 
style-adjusted buy-and hold abnormal return is around 18% higher for family acquirers than for 
non-family acquirers. Further, contrary to the argument that founding family members make 
value-destroying diversifying acquisitions to minimize the risk of their personal portfolio, we do 
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not find that family firms lose value in diversifying acquisitions. This result is consistent with 
Stein’s model (1997) showing that diversification helps to reduce the cost of capital of the firm. 
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ESSAY 1: THE POWER OF CONTROL: THE ACQUISITION DECISIONS OF NEWLY 
PUBLIC DUAL-CLASS FIRMS 
 
Introduction 
Recent research has established that the desire to acquire other firms is one of the main 
motives of firms making an initial public offering (IPO). These studies find that going public 
facilitates acquisitions by providing funding to the newly public firm in the form of cash as well 
as the opportunity to raise capital through subsequent equity or debt issuance (Brau, Francis, and 
Kohers, 2003; Celikyurt, Sevilir, and Shivdasani, 2010; Hovakimian and Hutton, 2010). When 
going public, firms have two choices: to go public with only one class of shares with the same 
voting rights (commonly called single-class); or to go public with two or more different classes 
of shares with the same cash flow rights, but unequal voting rights (commonly called dual-class). 
In a single-class firm, typically there is a provision of one share-one vote. In a representative 
dual-class firm, there are “inferior” and “superior” classes of shares, and insiders hold “superior” 
class of shares which come with higher voting rights per share (generally ten votes per share). 
This creates a wedge between the voting rights and cash flow rights for the insiders in a typical 
dual-class firm. 
Previous studies have documented that the difference in cash flow rights and voting 
rights in the dual-class structure makes some of their corporate behaviors, such as pay-out policy 
(Jordan, Liu, and Wu, 2012), sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance (Smart, Thirumalai, 
and Zutter, 2008), and selection of management team (Grossman and Hart, 1988), substantially 
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different from those of the single-class structure. Given that the desire to make acquisitions is a 
key motivation behind going public, we are interested in examining the acquisition decision for 
dual versus single-class firms, and the resulting shareholder wealth implications of these 
decisions. 
In this paper, we examine the following research questions. First, we investigate whether 
the difference in cash flow and voting rights in single versus dual-class firms affects the quality 
of acquisition decisions in these two types of firms. In particular, given that newly public firms 
are active acquirers, we are interested in examining the acquisition tendency of single versus 
dual-class IPO firms as well as the long-run wealth effects of these acquisition decisions. In this 
analysis, the method of payment is a relevant consideration since previous studies have found the 
stock versus cash payment choice influences both the short and long-run wealth effects of merger 
decisions. Thus, we examine whether the likelihood of paying with stock is significantly 
different in acquisitions by single and dual-class IPO firms. Furthermore, focusing only on dual-
class firms, we analyze how the cash flow rights, voting rights, and the wedge between cash flow 
rights and voting rights of insiders affects the method of payment choice in takeovers.  
In this analysis, we also consider the types of acquisitions that dual versus single-class 
acquirers are inclined to make. Chemmanur and Tian (2011) find that firms with a larger number 
of antitakeover provisions (ATPs) are more innovative, and Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2010) 
posit that the dual-class structure is the most extreme example of antitakeover provisions. Based 
on this evidence, we are interested to see whether dual-class IPO firms acquire more in 
innovative industries, and whether those acquisitions create value.  
Further, Brau, Couch, and Sutton (2012) have documented that firms that acquire within 
a year of going public significantly underperform for one- through five-year periods following 
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the first year, whereas the firms which do not acquire within the first year do not significantly 
underperform during those periods. Motivated by this result, we inquire whether there is a 
difference in long-term performance between dual-class IPO firms that acquire within one year 
of going public and those that do not acquire. 
Our study is related to Mausulis, Wang, and Xie (2009), who highlight the potential 
agency problems in a sample of dual class firms between 1995 and 2003.  Their results show that 
dual class firms with greater divergence in voting and cash flow rights have lower cumulative 
abnormal returns around merger announcements.  Our study is distinct from the Masulis et al. 
(2009) study in several ways. First of all, we compare single and dual-class IPO firms, whereas 
Masulis et al. (2009) focus on dual-class firms. Their dual-class sample is mostly of mature firms 
whereas we study newly public firms, whose acquisition activity outpaces that of mature firms 
both in number and volume, as noted in Celikyurt et al. (2010).  Also, the focus of Masulis et al. 
(2009) is on the short-term performance around the acquisition announcement, while we 
compare the difference in acquisition activities for dual versus single class firms, the method of 
payment choice, and the post-merger performance for newly public single and dual-class firms. 
Using SDC data from 1990 to 2008, our empirical analysis provides the following results. 
First of all, we do not find notable differences in the frequency of overall acquisitions by single 
versus dual-class IPO firms. Both types of IPOs are active acquirers, consistent with recent 
literature. Also, dual-class IPO firms are significantly more likely to pay with cash in 
acquisitions than single-class IPO firms. That is, dual-class firms try to avoid paying with stock 
as they want to retain control of the firm. Further, on average, acquiring dual-class IPOs perform 
better in the long-run (up to four years) than acquiring single-class IPO firms. These results are 
mainly driven by acquisitions by dual-class IPO firms in innovative industries. This finding 
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suggests that the governance structure in dual-class firms allows them to make long-term 
investments in highly risky positive NPV projects as they do not have to face as much equity 
market pressure to maintain short-run stock price. The shares with higher voting rights are 
relatively illiquid in nature, so the insiders with such shares have incentive to monitor firm well. 
This could be an explanation of why dual-class firms perform better in risky projects than their 
single-class peers. Finally, we find some evidence that, compared to dual-class IPOs which do 
not acquire after going public, those which acquire perform better in the long-run. 
Our paper contributes to the finance literature in the following dimensions. First, to the 
best of our knowledge, we are the first to compare the acquisition activities of single-class and 
dual-class IPO firms. Some earlier studies compare the long-run performance of single-class and 
dual-class firms, while others focus on performance within dual-class companies. As one of the 
main motivations for firms to pursue IPO is to make acquisitions, our comparison sheds light on 
the similarities and differences of acquisition activities of firms with different shareholder voting 
rights arrangements. 
Second, our paper’s finding that newly public dual-class firms are highly reluctant to pay 
with stock provides further evidence that the dual-class firms prefer to maintain their control 
rights when making acquisitions.  
Most importantly, our finding that the long-run performance of dual-class IPO acquirers 
is significantly better than those of single-class IPO acquirers contributes to the literature by 
providing evidence that provisions like dual-class structures can be desirable for long-term value 
creation. Such arrangements demand better monitoring by insiders, because of the lack of easy 
exit, and also allow managers to focus on long-term goals instead of short-term stock price 
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fluctuations. Further, this finding suggests that the benefits of control might go beyond private 
profits of insiders and actually can be value enhancing. 
 
Arguments in Favor of and Against Dual-Class Structure 
The presence of dual-class firms is significant in the US corporate world. Gompers et al. 
(2010) point out that 6% of COMPUSTAT firms are dual-class, which comprises about 8% of 
the market capitalization of all firms. The benefits and drawbacks of dual-class structure of 
stocks are difficult to judge as stated by the columnist Andrew Hill (2011) of Financial Times: 
“The advantage of a dual-class share structure is that it protects entrepreneurial management 
from the demands of ordinary shareholders. The disadvantage of a dual-class share structure is 
that it protects entrepreneurial management from the demands of shareholders.”  
The implications of a dual-class structure for merger decisions have a bright side and a 
dark side. When we view dual-class structure as a medium of raising outside capital without 
losing substantial control, rather than just as a mechanism to separate cash-flow rights and voting 
rights, we can see many positive consequences of this structure (Crone and Plaksen, 2010). For 
example, the dual-class structure mitigates the problem of underinvestment as the managers will 
be less afraid of their removal by misinformed investors (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985). This 
structure also facilitates long-term investments through the ability to raise outside capital without 
substantial takeover threat. Thus, the dual-class structure solves the problem of managerial 
myopia (Chemmanur and Jiao, 2006). Similarly, with the help of the dual-class provision, 
corporate insiders can better diversify their personal wealth so that they will not be tempted to 
make diversifying acquisitions (in order to diversify their personal wealth portfolio) which may 
not create value (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988). The above mentioned arguments in favor 
 6 
 
of dual-class structure suggest that, on average, dual-class firms may make value-enhancing 
acquisition decisions. 
At the same time, there are negatives of having dual-class provisions as well. First of all, 
the dual-class structure is infamous for providing managers (or corporate insiders) an opportunity 
to extract private benefits of control at the expense of minority shareholders (Bebchuck and 
Weisbach, 2010). The ability of insiders to redirect corporate resources has adverse 
consequences to firm value, as well documented in the literature (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Zwiebel, 1995). Masulis et al. (2009) find that as the wedge between the voting rights and cash 
flow rights increases, the managers are more likely to take private benefits at shareholders’ 
expense. Specifically in such firms, the authors find that “corporate cash holdings are worth less 
to outside shareholders, CEOs receive higher compensation; managers make shareholder value-
destroying acquisitions more often and capital expenditures contribute less to shareholder value.” 
Further, Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) find that firms with disproportionate voting structure 
exhibit worse operating performance because they make less efficient investment decisions. 
Bebchuck, Kraakman, and Triantis (2000) also argue that the market for corporate control is less 
effective and takeover discipline is weaker in dual-class firms compared to firms with dispersed 
ownership (also see Smart et al., 2008). These arguments suggest that the acquisition decisions 
of dual-class firms can be value destructive. 
In addition to the above discussion, we further discuss three hypotheses which again 
argue in favor of or against dual-class structure. 
Entrenchment hypothesis. Recently, researchers (Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003; 
Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrel, 2009, and others) have documented 
that strong shareholder rights are positively related to stock returns, operating performance, and 
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valuation. This line of research mostly agrees that the most important restrictions to shareholder 
rights are antitakeover provisions (ATPs), and Gompers et al. (2010) point out that the dual-class 
firms are the most extreme examples of firms with ATPs. So, the common theme of this research 
is that managers extract private benefits of control by exploiting ATPs and the divergence 
between insiders’ voting rights and cash flow rights that exists in dual-class firms. 
Liquidity hypothesis. This stream of research claims that stock-market liquidity 
provides an opportunity for an “easy exit” for those investors who do not agree with the 
incumbent management. Bhide (1993) argues that such “easy exit” because of liquidity access 
discourages internal monitoring. Generally, the shareholders with superior voting shares of dual-
class firms cannot enjoy this ‘easy exit’ option because the shares with higher voting rights are 
relatively illiquid. On this ground, Bohmer, Sanger, and Varshney (1996) argue that, to the 
extent that holding this illiquid investment imposes a cost, it should reduce the divergence of 
interest between management and outside shareholders. So, the better monitoring imposed by no 
option of “easy exit” should help such firms perform better. 
Equity market pressure hypothesis. Stein (1988) argues that the governance structure 
with a higher number of ATPs could be optimal as those provisions reduce managerial “myopia” 
of signaling firm quality by boosting short-term performance at the expense of long-term value. 
Shliefer and Vishny (1989) point out that the managers of the firms with weaker shareholder 
rights experience enough job security whereas the managers of firms with strong shareholder 
rights might sub-optimally invest in their area of expertise to retain their job. Core, Guay, and 
Rustics (2006) argue that there is no conclusive evidence that a large number of ATPs in a firm 
is detrimental to long-term performance. Their point is that ATPs might destroy shareholders 
value in a subset of firms, and they might be value enhancing or value neutral in other types of 
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firms. Chemmanur and Tian (2011) examine this possibility and provide evidence of a causal 
relationship that firms with a larger number of ATPs are more innovative. Their argument is that 
ATPs insulate managers from the short-term pressure of satisfying equity market expectations. 
So, if dual class firms focus more acquiring innovation, we may expect that these firms perform 
relatively well in the long term. 
 
Why IPO Firms? 
We follow Smart et al. (2008) and concentrate on IPO firms instead of seasoned firms. 
They argue that firms set up governance rules prior to the IPO and abide by those rules and 
evolve as a public company. They further mention that concentrating on newly public firms 
avoids issues arising from the switch from single-class to dual-class status through 
recapitalization. Further, they mention that, although it is common in both single and dual-class 
firms for insiders to own large fraction of outstanding shares, when firms return to the seasoned 
equity market (SEO), the voting power of single-class insiders’ declines at the same rate as their 
cash flow rights, while dual-class insiders’ voting rights change at a much slower rate than their 
economic ownership. So, focusing on IPOs minimizes the influence brought by such activities. 
Bebchuck and Zingles (2000) and others also argue that firms are more likely to go public with 
an already set governance structure because the cost of doing otherwise needs to be borne by 
those making this decision. 
The rest of the paper will proceed as follows. Section 2 describes the related literature 
and presents the hypotheses. Section 3 discusses data and presents descriptive statistics. Section 
4 and Section 5 explain the empirical results, while Section 6 provides the conclusions. 
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Relation to the Existing Literature 
Single versus Dual-Class Firms and the Method of Payment 
 Given the importance of the method of payment choice on merger outcomes, we first 
discuss reasons for differences in the choice of merger financing for single versus dual-class 
IPO. Faccio and Masulis (2005) argue that cash and stock offers have conflicting effects. They 
point out that most cash offers require debt financing, as many acquirers do not possess sufficient 
cash and/or liquid assets to finance their cash payment. So, they note that the choice between 
cash or stock financing becomes a tradeoff between corporate control concerns of issuing equity 
and the bankruptcy cost of issuing debt. As one of the objectives of going IPO with dual-class is 
to retain control (Arugaslan, Cook, and Kieschnick, 2010), we can expect that the dual-class IPO 
firms might pay more with cash in takeovers, as this method of payment does not dilute their 
voting rights and hence their control motive. However, there is another side of the story as well. 
Many insiders with superior voting rights in dual-class firms have a significant amount of wealth 
invested in the firm. These shareholders may be reluctant to use cash as a method of payment 
since the debt financing typically used to finance the cash offer increases the likelihood of 
bankruptcy of the firm.  
Clearly, a similar tradeoff exists in single-class firms as well. Yet, the two structures 
might weigh the threat of diminished control and the threat of increased bankruptcy risk 
differently, which may lead to different methods of payment in acquisitions made by newly-
public single and dual-class firms. 
Further, Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) provide evidence that an extra dollar of cash is 
less valuable to shareholders at companies with more anti-takeover provisions. They attribute 
their finding to managers extracting private benefits from corporate cash holdings in such firms. 
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This would suggest that the managers in dual-class firms will be more interested in paying with 
stock and saving cash for future private benefits. 
These different predictions regarding the payment choices of single versus dual-class 
acquirers further motivates us to study this question empirically. 
In examining a sample of dual-class firms between 1995 and 2003, Masulis et al. (2009) 
provide summary statistics showing that 56% of the takeover deals are paid with cash, which is 
similar to our summary statistics. In their analysis, they find that stock offers used to purchase 
public targets are negatively related to the bidder CAR around the time of the merger 
announcement, and stock offers used to purchase private targets are positively related to bidder 
CAR. These findings for dual-class acquirers are in line with prior studies examining bigger 
samples of non-dual-class acquirers. 
Further, not all dual-class firms possess the same proportions of insiders’ cash-flow rights 
and voting rights. These two rights have different effects on firm value, as is well-documented in 
Gompers et al. (2010). They find that firm value increases with insiders’ cash-flow rights and 
decreases with insiders’ voting rights. Motivated by that study, we test the effect of cash flow 
rights, voting rights and the wedge (the difference between voting rights and cash flow rights) on 
the choice of the method of payment by dual-class firms in corporate takeovers. 
 
Single and Dual-Class Firm Long-Run Performance 
Smart et al. (2008) study the short and long-run performance of single-class and dual-
class IPO firms but they do not consider the acquisition activities of single and dual-class firms. 
Using the calendar-time portfolio regression method, they find insignificant abnormal returns for 
both single-class and dual-class IPOs except in the case of the four-factor equal-weighted 
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portfolio regression in which they find significantly positive abnormal returns for single-class 
IPO firms and insignificantly positive abnormal returns for dual-class firms. In comparing 
operating performance for up to five years, measured by ROA and EBITDA, they do not find 
significant differences between single-class IPOs and dual-class IPOs.  
Furthermore, Gompers et al. (2010) focus only on dual-class firms between 1995 and 
2003 and find that firm value is increasing in insiders’ cash-flow rights and decreasing in 
insiders’ voting rights.  
 
Acquisition in Innovative Industries 
As discussed in Sevilir and Tian (2012), the previous literature highlights two main 
channels through which innovation helps acquiring firms. One view, based on Aghion and Tirole 
(1994), is that less innovative firms can become more innovative by acquiring firms which are 
more efficient at innovation. This view suggests that acquisition enhances innovation where 
firms with lower innovation efficiency acquire firms with higher innovation efficiency. The other 
argument is based on Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008), which suggests that M&A can 
synergize innovation by bringing complementary assets of merging firms together. 
Similarly, Sevilir and Tian (2012) find that acquiring a target that is more R&D intensive 
than the acquirer enhances the innovative output of the acquirer. Bena and Li (2012) document 
that technological overlaps such as proximity of innovation activities and mutual citations of 
patents between two firms significantly affects in merger pair formation. 
Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh (2012) point out that overconfident CEOs invest more in 
innovation, obtain more patents and patent citations, and are more successful in innovation for 
given research and development expenditures. Paredes (2005) argues that high CEO pay 
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provides positive feedback to CEO and signals CEO’s success. He further reasons that positive 
feedback and recent success can make CEOs overconfident. The finding of Masulis et al. (2009) 
and Smart and Zutter (2003) suggest that dual-class CEOs get higher compensation. Overall, 
these arguments support that the CEOs in dual-class firms are more likely to be overconfident. 
So, we can expect more investment in innovation by dual-class firms. 
These thoughts collectively imply that a firm’s investment in innovation (for example 
acquiring innovative firm) is necessary but risky undertaking for long-term success of a firm. 
Along with discussion in Section 1, the arguments here provide signal that dual-class firms 
which are full with anti-takeover provisions and whose CEOs are more overconfident might 
invest more and also perform better in long-run by acquiring firms in innovative industries. In 
this paper, we test this speculation empirically. 
 
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We obtain our initial sample of IPOs from the Security Data Company (SDC) New Issues 
Database. From our initial sample of IPOs, we exclude foreign issuers, REITs, penny stocks 
(issues with less than $5 offer price) and financial firms (firms with SIC codes between 6000 and 
6999). We obtain the sample of dual-class IPOs from Jay Ritter’s website. Our sample period for 
the single-class dual-class IPOs extends from 1990 through 2008. 
Similarly, for our merger sample, we include all completed mergers over the period from 
1990 through 2012 from the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. We exclude acquisitions 
of partial interests or acquisitions of remaining interests from our sample. If the consideration 
structure is labeled unknown or other, then we exclude those acquisitions as well. In order for an 
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acquisition to be in our sample, the transaction value must be at least one million dollars and at 
least one percent of the market value (one fiscal year before) of the acquiring firm. 
Further, the data for the insiders’ cash flow rights and voting rights is generously 
provided by Andrew Metrick, which is used in Gompers et al. (2010) where the details of the 
data can be found. This data set is for dual-class firms (not necessarily IPOs) existing between 
years 1995 and 2002. If the firm happens to have gone public during those years, then we get 
their information for the year in which they go public and the subsequent years. If the firm has 
gone public in earlier years (between 1990 and 1994), then we use the data for the insiders cash 
flow rights and voting rights from the first available year. Here, we make an assumption that the 
insiders’ cash flow rights and voting rights do not change after going public. While this might 
not be true, in general, firms slowly become widely held, as noted by Helwege, Pirinsky, and 
Stulz (2007) who find that a majority of IPO firms has insider ownership below 20%, 10 years 
after going public. If this assumption provides a bias, but the bias is against finding significant 
differences between dual and single-class firms. Finally, necessary accounting information 
comes from COMPUSTAT. 
As in Gompers et al. (2010), we define the wedge variable (Wedge) as the difference 
between the voting rights and the cash flow rights of the insiders in the dual-class firms. 
Following previous research, we also define wedge as the ratio of the voting right and cash flow 
rights of the insiders. 
Panel A of Table 1 provides an annual distribution of single-class and dual-class IPOs in 
our sample between 1990 and 2008. The table shows that there are 7.6% dual-class IPOs overall 
during the sample period. This finding is comparable to previous results showing 6% dual-class 
firms in Gompers et al. (2010) and 9.6% dual-class IPOs in Smart and Zutter (2003). 
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In Panel B of Table 1, we report univariate comparison of certain characteristics of single 
and dual-class firms which acquire within three years of going public. The result suggest that 
dual-class IPO firms are relatively larger in terms of market capitalization, conduct more related 
mergers, and have higher leverage than newly public single-class firms. In addition, the dual-
class IPO’s, on average, have lower Tobin’s Q and less VC-backing. 
Panel A of Table 2 shows the number of acquisitions made by single-and dual-class firms 
within 3-, 4-, and 5-years of going public, distributed by the method of payment used in the 
acquisitions. We see that in all three year ranges, the methods of payments employed by single 
and dual-class firms are significantly different. For example, in acquisitions made by dual-class 
firms within three years of going public, 52% of the acquisitions are paid with cash and only 
19% are paid with stock. In acquisitions made by single-class firms within three years of going 
public only 36% are cash offer and 36% are stock offers. The percentages paid for with hybrid 
method are pretty similar: 29% in both cases. Similar percentage distributions are true in cases of 
acquisitions within four and five years of going public. 
Panel B of Table 2 exhibits the distribution of types of acquisitions (mergers, acquisitions 
of assets or other) made by single and dual-class IPOs within three, four, and five years of going 
public. We see that dual-class firms acquire assets more than single-class firms do. Because of 
this observation, we control for acquisition of assets in our regressions, and we also perform 
separate tests excluding acquisitions of assets. 
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Empirical Results 
Empirical Model and Multivariate Results 
In panels A and B of Table 3, we test whether the share class structure (single or dual) 
influences the choice between stock and cash as a method of payments by newly public firms in 
corporate takeovers within three, four or five years after going public. Specifically, we run the 
following logit regression: 
 
log [
𝑃(𝑦=1)
1−𝑃(𝑦=1)
]
𝑖
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐾𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑖 +
𝛽6𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑉𝑖 + 𝛽8𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽9𝑉𝐶𝐵𝐴𝐶𝐾𝐸𝐷𝑖 +
𝛽10𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽11𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽12𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻𝑖 + 𝛽13𝑇𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅𝑖 +
𝛽14𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆𝑖 + 𝛽15𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽16𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (2) 
 
where the dependent variable takes the value of 1 (that is 𝑦 = 1 ) if the acquiring firm i used 
stock as a method of payment and zero otherwise. We include the hybrid method of payment as 
non-stock payment. 𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquirer is a dual-class firm and 
0 if it is a single-class acquirer. 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is the logarithm of the market value of equity of the firm in 
the year prior to the acquisition (in case of the firm going public and making an acquisition are in 
the same year we use the market value of the same year). 𝑇𝑂𝐵𝐼𝑁𝑄 is the Tobin’s Q of the 
acquiring firm measured as the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of 
assets. 𝑆𝐿𝐴𝐶𝐾 is cash and short-term investments of the firm divided by the total assets of the 
firm in the year prior to the acquisition. 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂 is the total long term debt of the firm 
divided by the market value of equity of the firm. 𝐶𝑅𝐼𝑆𝐼𝑆 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
year is 2001, 2002, 2007 or 2008 and zero otherwise. 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝑉 is the ratio of the earnings-
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before-interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by the net interest paid by the firm. 𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑅𝑂 is the 
logarithm of the IPO Proceeds value net of fees and expenses scaled by total assets. 𝑉𝐶𝐵𝐴𝐶𝐾𝐸𝐷 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm had VC backing before the IPO and zero otherwise. 
𝑅𝐷𝐸𝐴𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 is the transaction value of the acquisition divided by market value of equity of the 
firm in the year prior to the acquisition. 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐷 is a dummy variable equal to one if both 
acquirer and target are in the same four digit industry and zero otherwise. 𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻 is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the acquiring firm is in a high tech industry and zero otherwise. 
𝑇𝐸𝑁𝐷𝐸𝑅 is a dummy variable equal to one if the deal is a tender offer and zero otherwise. 𝑆𝑈𝐵𝑆 
is a dummy variable equal to one if the target is a subsidiary and zero otherwise; and 𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝑇 is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the deal is an acquisition of assets and zero otherwise. 
 
A Difference in Method of Payments in Acquisition by Single and Dual-Class IPO 
Firms 
In Panel A of Table 3, the dependent variable is stock, which is equal to 1 if the method 
of payment is stock and 0 if the method of payment is cash or hybrid. The coefficients of the 
dual-class dummy are -0.66, -0.90 and -0.86 for the samples with acquisitions within 3-years of 
going public ( with different control variables), each of which is significant at the 1 percent level. 
This result suggests that, compared to single-class IPO firms, dual-class IPO firms are highly 
reluctant to pay with stock in corporate takeovers. For example, Model 1 suggests that the odd of 
paying with stock is ½ ( =exp(-0.66) if the acquiring firm is a newly public dual-class firm. We 
get qualitatively similar results for the samples with acquisitions within four or five years of 
going public. In these models, we use several control variables which are considered as 
determinants of method of payment in acquisitions in the existing literature. Most of the 
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variables have the expected signs. For example, we observe that larger firms (firms with larger 
market cap) mostly use either cash or hybrid methods of payment, as evidenced by the variable 
SIZE. The positive and significant coefficient of TOBINQ suggests that firms with higher growth 
opportunities tend to pay with stock. Similarly, VCBACKED firms have a higher likelihood of 
using stock offers in mergers. Firms are more likely to use cash offers when acquiring assets or 
subsidiaries of other firms, consistent with prior studies which show that parent firms often sell 
subsidiaries to obtain a needed cash infusion. The positive and significant coefficient of the 
variable SLACK is counterintuitive as it suggests that firms with higher cash do not use cash or 
hybrid as a method of payment. However, Havokimian and Hutton (2010) also find a similar 
significantly positive relationship between slack and the decision to use stock. They attribute this 
finding to the argument in the literature that financially constrained firms tend to hold more cash 
and prefer to use stock as a method of payment (Almeida and Campello, 2007). 
In Panel B of Table 3, we repeat the regression as in Panel A of Table 3 but we exclude 
observations with the hybrid method of payment. Thus, in this table, the dependent variable is 
stock, which is equal to 1 if the method of payment is stock and 0 if the method of payment is 
cash. In this table, all the results are similar except that the significance level of the dual dummy 
decreases slightly to the 5%.  
These results suggest that share class structure is an important determinant of the method 
of payment in mergers and acquisitions. The findings support the argument that dual-class firms 
do not want to lose control of the firm by diluting their voting rights. In the next set of analysis, 
we concentrate on newly public dual-class IPO firms only. 
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Effect of Cash-Flow Rights and Voting Rights of the Insiders in the Choice of 
Methods of Payments 
In Table 4A, we test the effect of insiders’ cash-flow rights in the choice of method of 
payment in acquisitions by dual-class IPO firms. In all three columns, the dependent variable is 
stock, which is equal to 1 if the method of payment is stock and 0 if the method of payment is 
cash. The logit regressions show that the cash-flow rights of insiders’ (CFR) is not significant, 
suggesting that insiders’ cash-flow rights are not an important determinant of the method of 
payment choice in newly public dual-class firms. In this table, we have included fewer 
explanatory variables than those in Tables 3A and 3B because of the small sample size. The 
control variables have expected signs. 
In Table 4B, we test the effect of insiders’ voting rights in the method of payment choice 
for dual-class IPO firms. The specification is similar to the specification in Table 4A. We 
observe that the variable capturing the voting rights of the insiders’ (VOTER), is negative and 
significant at the 10% level for the sample with acquisitions within three years of going public 
and at 5% in cases with acquisitions within four or five years of going public. The significant 
negative coefficients of VOTER tell us that the higher the voting rights of insiders, the more 
reluctant they are to pay with stock. This result supports the finding in Tables 3A and 3B 
showing that dual-class IPO firms are less inclined to pay with stock in general, likely due to the 
desire for control. 
Together, the results of Tables 4A and 4B provide preliminary evidence that the desire 
and/or ability to control firm is better substantiated if the insiders have higher voting rights than 
if they have higher cash-flow rights. 
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Effect of Wedge on the Choice of Method of Payment 
In Table 4C and 4D we test the effect of the wedge between the voting rights and cash-
flow rights of insiders in the choice of the method of payment by newly public dual-class firms. 
We measure wedge in two ways. In Table 4C, WEDGE is defined as the insiders’ voting rights 
minus the insiders’ cash-flow rights, whereas in Table 4D, WEDGE is defined as the ratio of the 
insiders’ voting rights to the insiders’ cash-flow rights.  
In Tables 4C and 4D, our variable of interest, WEDGE, is negative and significant in all 
three columns. Thus, the higher the wedge between insiders’ voting rights and cash-flow rights, 
the less likely the firms are to issue equity in takeovers. This result corroborates the finding of 
Arugaslan et al. (2010) that the objective of going public with dual-class is to retain control of 
the firm after going public as well. 
 
Effect of High versus Low Wedge on the Choice of Method of Payment 
In Tables 5A, 5B and 5C, we are interested in examining how high versus low wedge 
influences the method of payment choice for dual-class IPO firms. When the wedge is very 
small, firms might be indifferent in choosing stock or cash as a method of payment, but when the 
wedge is substantial enough the firms might use that to seek rent. In order to investigate this, we 
compare three logit regressions with cut-offs at 5%, 10% and 15% for the WEDGE variable. 
Specifically, we create a dummy variable HW as follows: For 5% cut-off, HW is equal to 0 if the 
wedge (insiders’ voting rights minus cash-flow rights) is less than 5% and equal to 1 otherwise; 
similarly for 10% cut-off, HW is equal to 0 if the wedge is less than 10% and equal to 1 
otherwise; and for 15% cut-off HW is equal to 0 if the wedge is less than 15% and equal to 1 
otherwise. We perform logit regressions with acquisitions within three years, four years, and five 
 20 
 
years in Tables 5A, 5B and 5C respectively. In each of the tables, we observe that as the cut-off 
increases, the HW variable becomes more negative and more significant up to the 15 % cut-off. 
Specifically, in Table 5A, when the cut-off is 5%, the coefficient of HW variable is -1.02 which 
is not significant; when the cut-off is 10%, the coefficient of HW variable is -2.84 which is 
significant at 5% level, and when the cut-off is 15%, the coefficient of HW variable is -4.72 and 
is significant at 1% level. This result suggests that the magnitude of the wedge between insiders’ 
voting and cash flow rights is an important determinant of the method of payment choice for 
dual-class acquirers.1 
 
Acquisition Activity and Long-Term Performance 
Acquisition Activities 
Tables 6A and 6B report the acquisition activities of single and dual-class IPO firms. In 
Table 6A, we consider the acquisitions that are at least one million dollars in transaction value 
and are at least one percent of the market capitalization of the firm for firms going public 
between 1980 and 2008. We see that 13.52% of the single-class and 13.09 % of the dual–class 
firms make acquisitions within one year of going public. Similarly, the table reports that around 
22.2% of single-class and 23.15 of the dual-class firms make such acquisitions within two years 
of going public. Also, the total number of firms acquired by single and dual-class within two 
years of going public are also comparable. Acquiring single-class firm acquire 1.55 targets, on 
average, whereas acquiring dual-class firm acquire 1.51 targets on average within two years of 
going public. 
                                                 
1 In these tables, we have removed eight acquisitions associated with negative wedge. The data indicates that in 
those firms, a superior class of shares possess one vote per share and an inferior class of share possess zero votes per 
share. As such, the insiders’ cash flow rights exceed the insiders voting rights. Interestingly, all those acquisitions 
are made with stock. 
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Table 6B reports all qualified acquisitions with no restriction on the transaction value. 
We see that 25.20% of the single-class and 25.34 % of the dual–class firms make at least one 
acquisition within one year of going public, whereas 37.58% of single-class and 40.11% of dual-
class firms make acquisitions within two years of going public. Furthermore, acquiring single-
class firm acquire 1.95 targets on average whereas acquiring dual-class firm acquire 2.23 targets 
on average within two years of going public. Thus, overall, we do not observe notable 
differences in the frequency of acquisitions for single-class and dual-class acquirers in the period 
after going public. 
In Table 6C, we compare the acquisition of innovative and non-innovative targets by 
single-class and dual-class IPO firms. By innovative targets, we mean firms with 4-digit SIC 
codes in the top one-third innovative industries based on citations per patent produced by all 
firms in that industry for the period during which patent data from NBER is available. We obtain 
this data from Sevilir and Tian (2012). The table shows that dual-class firms acquire relatively 
higher percentage of targets from innovative industry than single-class firms do. Specifically, 
52.68% of the acquisitions that single-class firms make within two years of going public are in 
innovative industries, while 60.87% of the targets that dual-class firms acquire are from 
innovative industries. 
Tables 6A, 6B and 6C collectively suggest that the dual-class IPO firms are involved in 
smaller acquisitions more often than single-class IPO firms. Also, dual-class firms make higher 
proportion of acquisitions of targets in innovative industries than their single-class counterparts.  
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Long-Term Performance of Acquiring Firms 
As acquisitions are long-term investments, we test whether dual-class acquiring firms 
perform better than acquiring single-class firms in the long-run. We measure the long-run 
performance of an acquirer by style-adjusted buy-and-hold returns. Benchmark returns for style-
adjusted BHARs are the returns of 25 size and book to market matched portfolios obtained from 
20 size and 20 book to market Fama-French portfolios: 20 size portfolios are grouped into 5 size 
portfolios and similarly, 20 book-to-market portfolios are grouped into 5 book-to-market 
portfolios and finally we have 5*5=25 size and book-to-market matched portfolios. The results 
are shown in the multivariate regressions in Table 7. In the regression models, we control for 
relevant firm characteristics, merger characteristics, as well as year and industry fixed effects. 
The dual-class indicator variable, DUAL, shows a positive and significant relationship with the 
acquirer’s long-run abnormal returns, as measured by the style-adjusted buy and hold abnormal 
return. Thus, contrary to the argument that the agency problems inherent in dual-class firms 
adversely affect their performance, our findings suggest that newly-public dual-class acquirers 
outperform single-class acquirers. However, given that dual-class acquirers are more likely to 
use cash payments in acquisitions, which are associated with better long-run performance, it is 
important to control for the method of payment. The interaction term between dual dummy 
(DUAL) and Cash dummy (MOPC) that is DUAL_MOPC, is not significant. This finding 
suggests that, the positive long-run performance of dual-class acquirers is not driven by the 
method of payment choice. 
Next, we examine whether dual-class IPO firms which value innovation perform better in 
the long-run. This test is partially a test of equity market pressure hypothesis. As innovation is a 
time consuming and high risk process with large probability of failure, dual-class firms have an 
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edge to take such risk because of the large numbers of ATPs and less pressure from stock price 
movements. In our multivariate regression, in Tables 7A to 7D we use an interaction of the dual 
dummy (DUAL) with the dummy for innovative target (INNOT). In all four tables where the 
dependent variables are one year BHAR to four year BHAR, respectively, we find that the 
interaction term is significantly positive. The dual dummy (DUAL) becomes insignificant. In 
column 3 of the models used in Table 7A to 7D, the coefficient of DUAL shows the effect of 
dual dummy (DUAL) on long-term performance when INNOT=0 (that is acquiring targets in 
non-innovative industries). The insignificant coefficient of DUAL suggests that BHAR is not 
related to acquisitions by dual-class firms in non-innovative industries. The positive sum of the 
coefficients of dual dummy (DUAL) and the interaction term DUAL_INNOT in models 7A to 7D 
suggests that acquiring targets in innovative industries have significant positive effect on BHAR. 
Thus, the results imply that dual-class IPO firms which acquire in innovative industries soon 
after going public perform better for at least up to four years after the acquisition compared to 
other single-class and other dual-class acquirers. We further investigate the effect on BHAR  of 
acquiring firms themselves being in the innovative industries. The results show that the 
interaction term DUAL_INNOA (interaction of DUAL dummy and Aacquiring in innovative 
industry dummy) are positive but not significant except in Panel B (in which it is significant at 
10% level). These results substantiate the finding that it is the acquisition in the innovative 
industries that creates value for newly public dual-class firms. 
 
Performance of Acquiring and Non-Acquiring Dual-Class IPO Firms 
Previous studies examining the acquisition activity of newly public firms has shown that 
newly public firms are not the best acquirers. Thus, we are interested in comparing the long-term 
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performance of acquiring relative to non-acquiring dual-class IPO firms. In table 8, we compare 
the style-adjusted BHARs of first year acquirers (that is, firms acquiring within one year of going 
public) and first year non-acquirers (the firms which do not make an acquisition within first year 
of going public). In the first year, the acquirers have an average BHAR of 2.04% which is 
insignificantly different from zero, but the non-acquirers have an average BHAR of -6.56% 
which is significantly negative at the 10% level. The result is different from the results of Brau, 
Couch and Sutton (2012), which finds that firms that acquire within a year of going public 
significantly underperform for 1-through 5-year periods following the first year whereas firms 
which do not acquire within the first year do not underperform. The results for the single-class 
acquirers and non-acquirers are qualititatively similar to the results of Brau et al. (2012). This 
finding suggests that the distinct nature of the dual-class form can be beneficial in merger 
decisions made by newly-public dual-class firms. 
 
Conclusion 
Recent studies provide evidence that firms go public to facilitate the process of acquiring 
other firms. However, it is unclear how a dual versus single-class structure influences acquisition 
activity after going public. We try to fill this void in the literature. We compare single and dual-
class IPO firms in terms of acquisition activity, payment method, and post-merger performance 
to improve our understanding of how these two structures differ in major corporate decisions and 
their implications for shareholder wealth. 
Consistent with prior research, we find that both types of IPOs are active acquirers. 
However, measuring long-run performance by buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR), our 
evidence shows that newly-public dual-class acquirers perform better than single-class acquirers 
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in the long-run. When we focus on the acquisition activities in innovative industries, we find that 
compared to single-class firms, dual-class IPO firms acquire more firms from innovative 
industries. Also, we find that dual-class IPO firms acquiring in innovative industries perform 
better for at least up to four years after the acquisition compared to other single-class and dual-
class acquirers. Similarly, in examining dual-class IPOs which acquire within one year of going 
public with those which do not acquire within one-year of going public, we observe that 
acquirers perform better than the non-acquirers.  
Given the importance of the method of payment in mergers and acquisitions, we also 
carefully examine the method of payment choice for dual versus single-class firms. The findings 
show that dual-class firms are highly reluctant to pay with stock. We attribute this trend of 
payment method of dual-class firms to their control motive. In a typical dual-class firm insiders 
normally possess “superior” class of stock which carries higher voting rights than their 
corresponding cash-flow rights. When they issue shares, there could be a dilution in the insiders’ 
voting rights which is against their control motive. With the help of data from Gompers et.al 
(2010), we disentangle the effect of insiders’ cash-flow rights, voting rights and the wedge 
between the voting rights and cash-flow rights on the choice of the payment methods by dual-
class IPO firms. We find evidence that the reluctance to pay with stock is not significant with the 
insiders’ cash-flow rights but it is highly significant with the insiders’ voting rights and with the 
wedge between the voting rights and the cash-flow rights. These results substantiate the control 
motive of going IPO with dual-class share structure.  
Viewed in the context of existing literature, these findings indicate that there are certain 
corporate activities in which dual-class firm structure is desirable. Also, the results are consistent 
with liquidity hypothesis which argue that the shareholders with “superior voting” rights in dual-
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class firms monitor firms more compared to the shareholders in single-class firms because those 
shareholders do not have an easy exit option of quitting the firm by selling their shares if they do 
not like the decisions of the existing management. Thus, better monitoring might be the reason 
for the better performance of dual-class acquirers. These results are also consistent with equity 
market pressure hypothesis which argue that the dual-class firms do not feel as much pressure 
from stock price movements so that they can focus on their long-term endeavors and hence fare 
better in the long-run. 
  
 27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ESSAY 2: ALL IN THE FAMILY: THE EFFECT OF FAMILY OWNERSHIP ON 
ACQUISITION 
 
Introduction 
Family firms are as prevalent as non-family firms around the world, as is well-established 
in the finance and business literature. For example, in an international study, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) report that 30% of firms are family controlled, whereas 36% are 
widely-held. Furthermore, Faccio and Lang (2002) observe family firms being the dominant 
ownership structure in Western Europe, excluding the UK and Ireland. Weisskopf (2012) also 
highlights that about one-third of the firms in the Swiss Exchange are family firms. Similarly, 
Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2000) report that about two-thirds of the firms in Asian 
countries have family ownership. Among large US companies (S&P 500), more than one-third of 
firms are classified as family firms (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006).  The 
substantial presence and unique ownership characteristics of family firms have attracted 
researchers to compare their corporate policies and performance with those of non-family firms. 
The main difference in the characteristics of family and non-family firms lies in the types 
of agency problems they possess. Generally speaking, family firms have at least one large 
shareholder and other small shareholders. For example, Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003) 
observe that founding families, on average, hold 19% of the firm’s outstanding equity in their 
sample. Because of the incentive of the large shareholder(s) to monitor the manager, the classic 
agency problem between shareholders and managers will generally be of a smaller degree in 
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family firms than in non-family firms. However, due to large shareholder’s control advantage, 
another type of agency problem emerges in which large shareholders may procure private profits 
at the cost of small shareholders. Hence, this type of agency problem is considered to be of larger 
magnitude in family firms than in non-family firms. 
Thus, there are two types of agency problems created by the difference in ownership, 
control, and management structures in family and non-family firms. The relative influence of 
these agency problems on the corporate strategies undertaken by firms may lead to differences in 
performance as well. There is no clear answer regarding which of these two types of agency 
problems is more impeding to value creation in a firm. 
Following Anderson and Reeb (2003), we consider a US public company as a family firm 
if the members of the instituting families still maintain share ownership in the firm or if family 
members still serve as board of directors. To test how the unique agency problems in these two 
different types of firms influence major corporate decisions, we focus on a decision area that is 
susceptible to agency problems: mergers and acquisitions. In this paper, we empirically examine 
the long run performance of family and non-family firms after they make an acquisition. 
Addressing this question will provide evidence on the relative impact of two different types of 
agency problems on the value creation or destruction in the M&A activities of U.S. corporations. 
Furthermore, we specifically examine the value implications of diversifying mergers 
made by family-firms. Founding families generally maintain undiversified portfolios in their 
firms. Also, the strong emotional attachment of founding family members to their firms may 
often lead to an unwavering commitment to firm survival. Anderson and Reeb (2003b) argue 
that, because of such concentrated holdings of the family members and their strong motive to 
warrant the continued existence of the firm, founding family members have inspirations to 
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moderate the risk of the firm. This argument signals that, in the hope of minimizing their firm 
risk and hence the risk of their personal wealth portfolio, family firms may undertake value 
destroying diversifying mergers.  At the same time, some theories in the literature argue that 
diversifying takeovers can be value creating. In a theoretical model, Stein (1997) shows that if 
management has an ability to determine the outcomes of projects, diversification provides an 
opportunity to minimize the cost of capital of the firm. Thus, diversification improves firms’ 
internal capital market, leading to lower cost of capital and thereby improving firm value. 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) indeed find that the cost of debt is lower in firms with founding 
family ownership. Another line of reasoning in favor of diversified firms is that, compared to 
focused firms which have highly correlated projects; diversified firms have the flexibility to 
choose from uncorrelated projects more often. As a result, diversified firms have a higher 
opportunity of creating value by choosing the best among the available projects (DeLong, 2001). 
Motivated by these arguments, we empirically compare the long-run performance of focus 
increasing and diversifying acquisitions by family and non-family firms. 
Most of the available evidence on the merger decisions of family firms is based on non-
U.S. firms. For example, Bae, Kang, and Kim (2002) show that influential shareholders in large 
Korean firms use mergers and acquisitions to channel wealth away from minority equity holders. 
However, Ben-Amar and Andre´ (2006) study Canadian firms and observe that the performance 
of acquiring firms is better if the firm has sizeable family ownership. Shim and Okamuro (2011) 
study Japanese firms from 1955-1973 and find that mergers occur less often in family firms than 
in non-family firms. While pre-merger family ownership and the probability of mergers are 
positively related in their study, they further find that mergers are more beneficial for non-family 
firms than for family firms. 
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Analyzing acquisitions of public targets by 103 newly public US family firms, Basu, 
Dimitrova, and Paeglis (2009) find a positive association between acquirer’s family ownership 
and abnormal returns and a negative association between target’s family ownership and 
abnormal returns around the merger announcement. Similar to Basu et al. (2009), Bauguess and 
Stegemoller (2008) also study the short-term performance of acquiring family firms and find that 
firms with founding family presence generally destroy firm value when they acquire. 
While closely related, our study differs from Basu et al. (2009), and Bauguess and 
Stegemoller (2008) in a number of important aspects. First, they look only at the short-run 
announcement returns around M&A, while we focus on the influence of family firm ownership 
on long-term value creation in the post-merger period. Also, we compare the value implications 
of diversifying versus focus-increasing acquisitions whereas they do not. Further, Basu et al. 
(2009) concentrates on newly public family firms and their acquisitions of public targets only. In 
our study, we consider new as well as mature firms and all three types of targets, public, private 
and subsidiary. 
Similarly, Caprio, Croci, and Del Giudice (2011) is also related to our paper. They study 
777 large continental European companies for the period 1990-2008. They find that the size of 
the voting rights of the largest shareholder in a family firm is negatively related to the propensity 
to acquire. They also find that the chance of being acquired by an unrelated party diminishes for 
the firms with family ownership. Studying cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), they find that 
family ownership does not reduce value when they acquire other companies. Though related, our 
paper is distinct from this paper in key ways. They mainly focus on relating the control motives 
of the largest shareholder in the family firms to the propensity to acquire, whereas we focus on 
the long-run value implications of acquisition decisions by family firms. We also find that family 
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firms do not destroy value during acquisitions in search of wealth diversification, whereas they 
do not examine this point of view. Also, their sample consists of large European firms whereas 
we study S&P 500 US companies. 
Our results show that family acquirers perform significantly better than non-family 
acquirers based on style-adjusted and market-adjusted buy-and-hold three-year abnormal returns. 
Calendar time portfolio regression models also show that the average monthly abnormal return 
for acquiring family firms is significantly positive, while it is insignificant for non-family 
acquiring firms during the three years after the effective date of acquisition. These results are 
consistent with Li and Srinivasan (2011), who find that stock returns around M&A 
announcements, as well as board attendance, are higher in founder-director firms compared with 
non-founder firms. They argue that if having a founder-director on the board implies better 
monitoring of the acquisition process, this enhanced monitoring would lead to more favorable 
M&A decisions and hence higher returns after M&A announcements.  Furthermore, our analysis 
of diversifying mergers shows that family firms that engage in focus-decreasing mergers do not 
destroy shareholder value.  This finding suggests that, in general, the main goal of acquisitions 
by family firms is not simply to diversify the personal portfolio of the family members. This 
finding is consistent with the theory that diversification helps to reduce the cost of capital of the 
firm which could enhance value of the firm. 
This study contributes to the literature examining M&A, agency problems, and family 
ownership. First, the findings help us to better understand the role of ownership structure in 
mergers and acquisitions activities. Contrary to the notion that family blockholders use M&A 
transactions to expropriate private benefits from small shareholders, we show that family 
acquirers perform better than non-family acquirers in the long-run.  Second, this paper adds to 
 32 
 
the vast literature in mergers and acquisition. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper 
to study the long-term performance of family firm acquirers versus non-family acquirers. The 
findings provide evidence on the effect of ownership and control on the takeover decisions of 
firms, showing that family firms are better acquirers than non-family firms. Implicitly, these 
findings suggest that the agency problem between shareholders and managers (which is of higher 
magnitude in non-family firms) is more detrimental than the agency problem between large and 
small shareholders (which is of higher magnitude in family firms) in acquisition activities by 
large US firms.  Also, the finding that diversifying acquisitions by family-firms do not destroy 
value provides avenues for future research to investigate how family-firms perform in cross-
border acquisitions or in geographic diversification. 
Furthermore, starting with Anderson and Reeb (2003), studies have shown that the 
market- and accounting performance of family firms is better than comparable non-family firms. 
However, the factors that lead to this better performance are not well understood. This paper tries 
to partially fill that gap by finding M&A as a channel through which family firms perform better 
than non-family firms. Finally, this study contributes to the M&A literature by providing another 
dimension to creation and destruction of firm value in mergers and acquisitions. 
 
Pros and Cons of Family and Non-Family Firms 
As reviewed in Anderson and Reeb (2003) and other studies, founding family ownership 
and control can be less profitable than dispersed ownership. For example, Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) argue that firms with diversified shareholders normally base their investments on the 
basic finance rules that maximize the value of the firm. However, large shareholders with 
undiversified holdings may have incentives to increase firm growth, technological innovation, or 
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firm survival as their primary objective, which may not necessarily lead to shareholder 
maximization. This point is in line with the Fama and Jensen’s (1983) position that combining 
ownership and control provides large shareholders an opportunity to swap profits for personal 
advantages. This logic is also consistent with Demsetz’s (1983) argument that concentrated 
shareholders with control rights may choose non-monetary consumption and, hence, take scant 
resources away from valuable investments. 
Also, many family firms hire top executives from inside the family, so they limit their 
pool of labor force to family members, thus missing the opportunity to hire talented and capable 
individuals from outside. Villalonga and Amit (2006) find that the disagreement between the 
family and nonfamily shareholders in descendant-CEO firms is more detrimental than the owner-
manager disagreement in nonfamily firms. Similarly, managerial entrenchment is another cost 
associated with family firms. Because of the family’s large stake, these firms may avoid positive 
NPV projects that cause them to relinquish control (e.g., takeovers). 
While some studies have pointed out the disadvantages of the family firm structure, other 
papers have argued that the family firm structure is value-enhancing as compared to nonfamily 
firms.  For example, Berle and Means (1932) claim that the value of the firm with concentrated 
ownership should increase as it reduces the conflict of interest between owners and managers. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) pose that the ownership and control combination can be beneficial as 
the large shareholders can minimize managerial expropriation. Undiversified shareholding and 
control of management strengthen them to monitor and influence the firm. Similarly, James 
(1999) argues that family owners have longer investment prospects, which leads to better 
investment productivity. Similarly, Stein (1988, 1989) models how long investment horizons of 
large shareholders mitigate the short-sighted decisions of managers. 
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Recent literature posits that blockholders can govern firms through “exit.” That is, selling 
a firm’s stock based on private information (Adamati and Pfliederer, 2009; Edamans, 2009; 
Edmans and Manso, 2011; Bharath, Jayaraman, and Nagar. 2012). These models suggest that the 
negative stock price impact of blockholder exit is detrimental to managers because of their equity 
interest in the firm (equity holding and/or compensation linked to equity). So, managers try to 
make sure that large blockholders do not exit the firm. This reasoning suggests that the family 
firms’ ownership structure, in which a founding family member is generally a blockholder or a 
reputed shareholder, reduces the agency problem between shareholders and managers and leads 
to better performance. 
These arguments suggest that, by minimizing the conflict of interest between owners and 
managers, by enhanced monitoring of managers, and by widening the investment horizon, 
concentrated ownership and control might increase firm value. 
 
Research on Family and Non-Family Firms 
Whether family ownership creates or destroys firm value is an intriguing question of 
interest in the academic research (Morck, Strangeleand, and Yeung, 2000; Anderson and Reeb, 
2003; Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003). The results are mixed so far. 
 Studying large U.S. firms, Holderness and Sheehan (1988) find that family firms have a 
lower Tobin’s q than nonfamily firms. Similarly, Morck et al. (2000) find that family successor 
controlled Canadian firms have lower labor to capital ratios, less R&D spending, and worse 
financial performance compared to other similar firms. Similarly, Faccio, Lang, and Young 
(2001) provide evidence that family control may harm minority shareholders in East Asian firms 
where transparency is low. 
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However, some studies provide evidence that family-owned firms are more valuable.  For 
example, Claessens et al. (2002) find that firm value increases with the cash-flow ownership of 
the largest shareholder for a sample of public firms in eight East Asian countries. Also, Anderson 
and Reeb (2003) find that family firms perform better than nonfamily firms, based on accounting 
performance and Tobin’s q, and after controlling for industry and firm characteristics. Their 
results are relatively unaffected by the consideration of other block holders or by the discrepancy 
between the family’s ownership and control rights. Their findings further show that the gain 
from family control becomes higher when the ownership stake exceeds about 30%. Using a more 
specific classification of family firms, Villalonga and Amit (2006) identified family and 
nonfamily firms as founder-CEO firms and descendant-CEO firms. Measuring firm performance 
by Tobin’s q and industry-adjusted q, they find that the classic principal-agent problem in 
nonfamily firms is more disadvantageous than the problem between family and nonfamily 
owners in the firms led by founder CEOs. However, the conflict between family and nonfamily 
shareholders in descendant-CEO firms is more costly than the owner manager conflict in non-
family firms. In comparing the performance of family controlled firms in Western Europe, 
Maury (2006) reports that active family control is associated with higher profitability compared 
to non-family firms, whereas passive family control doesn’t affect profitability. By separating the 
founding family ownership effect from the general blockholder effect, Andres (2008) provides 
evidence from German exchange-listed companies that family firms outperform widely-held 
firms as well as firms with other types of concentrated holdings. They further report that family 
businesses are better only in firms in which a member of the instituting family is still serving 
either as an executive or as a board member. 
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Research on Various Corporate Policies of Family and Non-Family Firms 
Recent studies have uncovered differences in corporate policies adopted by family and 
non-family firms. For example, Anderson et al. (2003) show that debt is less expensive for the 
firms with founding family ownership, both statistically and economically. Furthermore, Hu, 
Wang, and Zhang (2007) find that family firms pay relatively less dividend (as measured by 
payout ratio) than non-family firms. Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin (2010) study the tax 
aggressiveness of family and non-family firms and find that family firms are less tax aggressive 
than nonfamily firms. They attribute this result to the family owners being more concerned with 
the non-tax costs of potential price discounts from non-family shareholders, the potential penalty 
imposed by the IRS, and the potential damage on family reputation. Liu (2011) find that cash 
holdings are significantly lower at family firms than in nonfamily firms. Examining the 
relationship between founding family ownership and compensation practice in Swiss Exchange 
listed firms, Weisskopf (2012) reports that founding family firms use cash compensation as a 
substitute for equity-based pay in most cases. 
In a similar vein, we are interested in studying the mergers and acquisitions decisions 
made by family versus non-family firms and the effect of such decisions on their long run 
performance. This investigation is interesting, particularly, because mergers and acquisitions are 
major restructuring events that have long-term implications for the firm. Furthermore, previous 
researchers have documented the agency problems which can affect takeover decisions. The 
literature argues that members of the founding families value control of the firm and they avoid 
becoming a takeover target. Also, as Liu (2011) notes, these firms quickly utilize cash, mostly on 
projects profiting the controlling family owners. Thus, family firms might be tempted to make 
acquisitions to deploy cash quickly and to avoid being taken over themselves. 
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Data 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) provide the original sample of family and non-family firms in 
the S&P 500 universe. The sample begins with the companies in the S&P 500 index as of the end 
of 1992 and continues through 1999. Anderson and Reeb (2003) categorize a firm as family 
owned if the members of the instituting families of a US public company still maintain share 
ownership in the firm or if family members still serve as board of directors. The sample for the 
period 2000-2006 is generously made available by Liu (2011), who expanded the sample until 
2006 using a variety of sources such as proxy statements of the firms, 10-Ks, histories of the 
companies, and different web sources. 
We obtained mergers and acquisitions data from Thompson Reuters’ SDC Database. 
Only completed acquisitions with majority stakes are considered. That is, buybacks, acquisitions 
of assets, minority stake acquisitions, exchange offers etc. are excluded from the sample. We 
have also omitted the firms in highly regulated industries, utilities and financials. Further, to 
capture deals with a significant economic impact on the bidder, we only include transactions 
with a value greater than $100 million. 
In order to study long-run performance, we include only the first acquisition (satisfying 
the above mentioned criterion) made by a firm within three years. As stated in Lyon, Barber, and 
Tsai (1999), the process of avoiding overlapping returns addresses the concern of cross-sectional 
dependence caused by overlapping observations. Loughran and Vijh (1997) point out that no 
look-ahead bias is present in this restriction. Also, we omit the year 1992 in the classification of 
family and non-family firm, to make sure that the firm was already classified under that type 
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before they started the acquisition process. With this selection procedure, we obtained 226 
acquisitions made by family and non-family S&P 500 firms. 
Finally, our source of financial data is COMPUSTAT and the source of return data is 
CRSP. We hand-collected Institutional ownership (INSOWN) and age of the CEO (CEOAGE) 
variables. The financial data was not available for 10 firms. Thus, our final sample consists of 
213 acquisitions from 1993 to 2006. Among those, 67 acquisitions are made by family firms, and 
146 are made by non-family firms. 
Table 9 Panel A provides a breakdown of the sample of 213 acquisitions by year, and 
Panel B shows the industry distribution. The percentage in Panel A is the percentage of family 
firms in a given year out of the total number of acquisitions in the sample in that year. In Panel 
B, percentages in the fourth column provide the percentage of acquisitions in that industry by 
both family and non-family firms. Columns 2 and 3 show that acquisitions by family firms are 
proportionately higher in industries like: Printing and Publishing, Consumer goods, Business 
Services, Machinery, and Restaurants, Hotels and Motels. Given the distribution of these 
acquisitions in years and industries, we control for year fixed effects and industry fixed effects in 
the multivariate analysis. 
Table 10 provides descriptive statistics for the control variables used in the multivariate 
analysis. Panel A provides the summary statistics for the continuous variables, and Panel B 
shows the percentage of family versus non family firms in different groups used as dummy 
variables. In panel A, we find that the mean transaction value (TVAL) for family firm 
acquisitions is $752 million whereas it is $2.34 billion for non-family firms. However, after 
scaling the transaction value by the bidder’s total assets, the values (TVAT) are 0.54 and 0.56 for 
family and non-family firms, respectively, and the difference is insignificant. Similarly, the 
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market value of equity for family and non-family firms are respectively $18 billion and $23 
billion. While the descriptive statistics are generally not significantly different for family versus 
non family firms, two notable exceptions are the level of cash holdings (CHLD), which is 0.36 
for family firms and 0.21 for non-family firms, and institutional ownership (INSOWN), which is 
56.54% for family firms and 66.35% for non-family firms. The difference between family and 
non-family firms in these two characteristics is significant at the 1% level. These descriptive 
variables are measured as of the fiscal-year end before the effective date of the acquisition. 
Panel B shows that the percentage of acquisitions involving public targets is larger for 
family acquirers (about 40%) than for non-family acquirers (about 27%).  The percentage of 
focus-increasing mergers, stock offers, and tender offers are similar for both types of firms.  
Almost half of the deals made by non-family acquirers are in high tech industries (based on SDC 
definitions), as compared to 42% for family acquirers. The full description of variables is 
provided in Appendix A. 
Table 11 presents the correlation coefficients of the variables used in empirical studies in 
the article. Our variable of interest, FAM, is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is a family 
firm and zero if the firm is a non-family firm.  The correlation coefficient between FAM and any 
of the other control variables is generally small. 
 
Multivariate Analysis 
Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) 
We calculate the buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) for each firm i for the period 
t=1 to t=T in the following way: 
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𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇 = ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1
− ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘,𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
 
where the mean buy and hold abnormal return is the value weighted average of the individual 
BHARs: 
 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖 ∗
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 
 
In order to test our hypothesis, we estimate the following cross-sectional regression: 
 
BHARi,t+k = α0 + β1FAMi,t + β2LMVLi,t−1 + β3TVATi,t + β4PUB + β5SHR + β6ROAi,t
+ β7DIVR + β8CHLDi,t + β9TO + β10INSOWNi,t + β11CEOAGEi,t
+ YearDummies + IndustryDummies + εi,t 
 
where BHARi,t+k is the buy-and-hold abnormal return k year(s) after the effective date of 
acquisition. The two benchmarks used when measuring BHAR are: style-adjusted (size and 
book-to-market adjusted) returns and market adjusted returns. Benchmark returns for style-
adjusted BHARs are the returns of 25 size and book to market matched portfolios obtained from 
20 size and 20 book to market Fama-French portfolios: 20 size portfolios are grouped into 5 
portfolios based on size and similarly, 20 portfolios based on book-to-market of the firms are 
grouped into 5 book-to-market portfolios and finally we have 5*5=25 size and book-to-market 
matched portfolios. The benchmark returns for market-adjusted BHARs are the CRSP valued-
weighted market returns.   FAMi,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if firm i is a family firm in year 
t and zero otherwise. LMVLi,t is the common logarithm of the market value for firm i in the last 
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trading day of the month before the effective date of the merger. TVATi,t is the SDC deal value 
(in millions) of the merger (TVAL) for firm i in year t ,scaled by lagged assets. PUB is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the target firm is public and zero otherwise.  SHR is a method of payment 
variable equal to 1 if the transaction is paid with stock only and zero otherwise. ROAi,t is the 
operating income before depreciation for firm i in year t scaled by lagged asset. DIVR is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquirer and target are not in the same 2-digit industry and zero 
otherwise. CHLDi,t is the sum of the Cash and Short term investments for firm i in year t scaled 
by lagged assets. TO is a tender offer indicator variable. INSOWNi,t is the percentage of 
institutional ownership of firm i in the year t. CEOAGEi,t is the age of the CEO of the firm i in 
year t.We also provide the definitions of these variables in Appendix C. 
 
Calendar-Time Portfolio Regression 
In addition to the cross-sectional approach described above, we also evaluate the long-
term returns using Calendar-time factor model regressions. The returns of the acquiring family 
and non-family firms are the value-weighted average of returns for firms in the sample. The 
value weighted averaging is performed separately for family and non-family firms for three years 
after the acquisition, and the models are also run separately. 
We start with a four factor model including the traditional Fama French three factors plus 
the momentum factor. We obtain the three factor data from Kenneth French’s website. We also 
include a liquidity factor of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003).  The two models we use are as 
follows: 
 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝛼2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡            (𝐴) 
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and 
 
𝑅𝑝𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝛼1(𝑅𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡) + 𝛼2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡       (𝐵) 
 
Where: 
 
𝑅𝑝𝑡  = monthly return on a value-weighted calendar time portfolio of family (non-family) firms. 
𝑟𝑓𝑡 = monthly return on three-month T-bill. 
𝐴𝑅𝑡  = intercept term, or the mean monthly abnormal return for the calendar time portfolio. 
𝑅𝑚𝑡  = monthly return on a value-weighted market index. 
𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  = monthly difference in the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of small and big stocks. 
𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  = monthly difference in the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of high book-to-market 
stocks and low book-to-market stocks. 
𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡  = monthly difference in the returns of a value-weighted portfolio of past winner stocks 
and past loser stocks. 
𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡  = the value-weighted return on the 10-1 portfolio from a sort on historical liquidity betas, as 
defined in Robert F. Stambaugh’s website. 
 
Multivariate Results 
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs). Table 12 provides the results of the cross 
sectional analysis of buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs). In Panel A, the dependent 
variable is the 1-year buy-and-hold abnormal return of the whole sample of firms, where the 
returns are calculated from the month after the effective date of the acquisition through the next 
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twelve months. After controlling for firm and deal characteristics as well as year and industry 
fixed effects, we see that family firms have around 15 to 18 % higher returns (significant at the 
5% level) than non-family firms in the first year after the merger, based on style adjusted and 
market adjusted benchmark returns. 
In Panel B of Table 12, the dependent variable is the 3-year buy-and-hold abnormal 
return, where the returns are calculated from the month after the effective date through the next 
thirty-six months. Using the same specification as in Panel A, we find that family firms have 
around 40% higher returns than the non-family firms in the three years following the merger 
based on style-adjusted returns. Similarly, using market-adjusted returns, the three year post-
merger returns are 36% higher for family acquirers than for non-family acquirers. The coefficient 
of the family firm dummy (FAM) is significant at the 5% level in the style-adjusted 
specification, and at 10% in the market-adjusted specification. Thus, our results are in line with 
other studies such as Anderson and Reeb (2003); Villalonga and Amit (2006) who have found 
better long term performance for family firms as compared to non-family firms. 
The control variables are not significant in explaining the acquirers’ three year post-
merger performance, with the one exception of the public target indicator variable, which is 
negative and significant. The lower announcement period abnormal return associated with 
purchasing public, as opposed to non-public, targets is a well-known phenomenon. For example, 
Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) find that bidder abnormal returns around the merger 
announcement are significantly higher when the target is private than when the target is public. 
However, this finding has not been well-established in the long-run.  Thus, our result provides 
long-run evidence to support the short-run findings, highlighting the importance of the target’s 
public status in acquisitions. 
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Calendar-time portfolio regression. In Table 13, we report the results of the four-factor 
model and five-factor model, which are run separately for family and non-family firms. Panel A 
shows that the average monthly abnormal return for non-family acquirers is 0.21%, with a t-
statistic of 1.15 (p-value 0.25). In contrast, the monthly abnormal return is 0.75% for the 
portfolio of family firms, with a t-statistic of 2.34 (p-value 0.02). The other factors have 
generally the expected signs. 
In Panel B of Table 13, we report the results for the five factor model (including Pastor 
and Stambaugh’s liquidity factor). In this case, the intercept for the non-family acquirers is 
0.25%, with a t-statistic of 1.40 (p-value 0.16). The average monthly abnormal return for family 
acquirers is 0.69%, with a t-statistic of 1.98 (p-value 0.04).  These time-series results help to 
confirm the cross-sectional findings showing better post-merger performance for family 
acquirers as compared to non-family acquirers. 
Family firms, diversifying mergers, and firm value. Given the potential increased 
diversification incentives of family firms, we also study the long-run value implications of 
diversifying and focus-increasing acquisitions by family and non-family firms in Table 6.  In 
Panel A of Table 6, we provide results of regressions with year and industry fixed-effects. The 
dependent variables are one-year style-adjusted and market-adjusted (respectively in first and 
second models) buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs) measured after the effective date of 
acquisition. The variables of interest are the family firm dummy (FAM) and the interaction term 
between family firm dummy and the dummy for diversifying merger (DIVR), that is 
FAM_DIVR.  We consider an acquisition as diversifying, that is DIVR=1, if the acquiring and 
the target firms are not in the same two-digit (four-digit) industry.  In the first model, we 
calculate style-adjusted buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs): the large positive sum of the 
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coefficients of FAM and FAM_DIVR (that is 5.80+26.35= 32.15) implies that diversifying 
acquisitions by family firms do not destroy value in the long-run. In the second model, we 
calculate market-adjusted buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs). Again, the  large positive 
sum of the coefficients of FAM and FAM_DIVR (that is 2.50+27.72= 30.22) reconfirms that 
diversifying acquisitions by family firms do not destroy value in the long-run. These results are 
based on two-digit definition of the DIVR dummy. We get qualitatively similar results when we 
use a four-digit SIC code definition of the DIVR dummy. 
In Panel B of Table 14, our dependent variable is the three-year buy and hold abnormal 
returns (BHARs). In Model 1, we use the style-adjusted BHARs as dependent variables and in 
Model 2; we use the market-adjusted BHARs as dependent variables. The results suggest that the 
three year stock-return performance (as measured by BHARs) is positively related (with large 
coefficients: 9.27+58.87=68.14and 8.32+54.62=62.94 for style-adjusted and market adjusted 
respectively) for diversifying mergers by family firms. The results indicate that the diversifying 
acquisitions by family firms do not destroy value in such undertakings. 
Overall, our results do not support the risk minimization via diversification motive of 
family firms during major corporate takeovers. That is, the results imply that family firms do not 
acquire firms from other industries just to diversify the portfolio of their personal wealth. Rather, 
the results are consistent with Stein’s model that diversification helps firms to create value by the 
lowering cost of capital. Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) find that, on average, corporate 
diversification do not destroy value. They provide evidence that the occurrence of much of the 
excess value reduction of acquiring firms is because they acquire already discounted business 
units and not because the acquisitions are diversifying. They suggest that the practice of using 
stand-alone firms as a benchmark for valuing the conglomerate needs to be reconsidered. In our 
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tests, we compare only acquiring firms and our benchmarks are from the universe of all US 
firms. Further, our findings are also consistent with the argument of DeLong (2001) that 
diversified firms can choose a good project from the pool of many unrelated projects so that they 
can create value in the long-run. 
 
Conclusion 
The value of the family firm structure, as compared to the non-family structure, has been 
the subject of much debate in the literature, which has shown largely mixed findings. There is 
relatively little evidence on the performance implications of these two different types of 
ownership structures for U.S. firms, especially in the long-run. Using a sample of 213 S&P 500 
family and non-family firms, we compare the long-run acquisition performance of family firms 
versus non-family firms. We employ cross-sectional regression models using buy-and-hold 
abnormal returns, as well as calendar time portfolio regression models too. We find that family 
acquirers perform significantly better than their non-family counterparts when performance is 
measured as style-adjusted or market-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns in the three years 
following the merger. Calendar time portfolio regression models also show that the average 
monthly abnormal return for family acquirers is significantly positive, while it is insignificant for 
non-family acquirers. These results are consistent with recent literature that has found that family 
firms tend to perform better than non-family firms. These results imply that the agency problem 
between shareholders and managers in traditional non-family firms might be more severe than 
the agency conflict between large and small shareholders in family firms. This line of research 
provides a rich source for future investigation. 
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Conflicting hypotheses motivate us to study diversifying versus focus-increasing 
acquisitions by family firms. One line of research suggests that family firms undertake value-
destroying diversifying acquisitions to reduce the risk of their wealth concentrated in the firm. 
An alternative argument is that diversification has positive aspects such as reduction in cost of 
capital and the ability to choose the most valuable projects from a wide set of uncorrelated 
projects. Our empirical analysis implies that, on average, family firms do not make value-
destroying diversifying acquisitions, suggesting that family firms do not pursue acquisitions 
simply to diversify the personal portfolios of the founding family members. The argument that 
diversifying acquisitions assist firms to reduce their cost of capital and enable firms to improve 
value is consistent with this finding. Our result is also in line with the logic that diversification 
provides firms with a set of uncorrelated projects so that firms may enhance value by selecting 
some of the most promising among them. 
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APPENDIX A: 
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES 
 
Variables Definitions 
DUAL 
A dummy variable equal to one if the acquirer is a dual-class firm and 0 if it is a 
single-class acquirer. 
SIZE 
Logarithm of the market value of equity of the firm in the year prior to the acquisition 
(in case the firm going public and making an acquisition are in the same year, we use 
the market value of the same year). 
TOBINQ The Tobin’s Q of the acquiring firm 
SLACK 
Cash and short-term investments of the firm divided by the total assets of the firm in 
the year prior to the acquisition. 
DEBTRATION The total long-term debt of the firm divided by the market value of equity of the firm. 
CRISIS 
A dummy variable equal to one if the year is 2001, 2002, 2007, or 2008 and zero 
otherwise. 
INTCOV 
The ratio of the earnings-before-interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by the net interest 
paid by the firm. 
IPOPRO Logarithm of the IPO Proceeds value net of fees and expenses scaled by total assets. 
VCBACKED 
A dummy variable equal to one if the firm had VC backing before the IPO and zero 
otherwise. 
RDEALSIZE 
The transaction value of the acquisition divided by market value of equity of the firm 
in the year prior to the acquisition. 
RELATED 
A dummy variable equal to one if both the acquirer and the target are in the same 
four-digit industry and zero otherwise. 
TECH 
A dummy variable equal to one if the acquiring firm is in a high tech industry (details 
of SIC codes is provided in Appendix A) and zero otherwise. 
TENDER A dummy variable equal to one if the deal is a tender offer and zero otherwise. 
SUBS A dummy variable equal to one if the target is a subsidiary and zero otherwise. 
ASSET 
A dummy variable equal to one if the deal is an acquisition of assets and zero 
otherwise. 
INNOT 
A dummy variable equal to one if the target is in one of the top sixteen industries by 
cite/pat from the table in Appendix B (reproduced from Sevilir and Tian, 2012). 
INNOTA 
A dummy variable equal to one if the target is in one of the top 16 industries by 
cite/pat from the table in Appendix B (reproduced from Sevilir and Tian, 2012). 
MOPC A dummy variable equal to one if the method of payment is Cash. 
PUBTAR A dummy variable equal to one if the target is a public firm. 
DUAL_MOPC Interaction term between DUAL and MOPC. 
DUAL_INNOT Interaction term between DUAL and INNOT. 
DUAL_INNOA Interaction term between DUAL and INNOT. 
CEOAGE Age of the acquiring CEO in the year of acquisition. 
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Source: Sevilir and Tian (2012)  
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APPENDIX C: 
DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIABLES 
 
TVAL = Deal value (in million) of the merger from SDC 
TVAT = TVAL/ Total Asset 
MVAL = (closing price of the stock in the last trading day of the month before the effective date 
of the merger) * Number of shares outstanding (in millions). 
LMVL = Common logarithm of MVAL. 
ROA = Operating income before depreciation/Total Assets. 
CHLD = Cash and Short term investments/Total Assets. 
INSOWN = Institutional ownership (in the percentage) in the acquiring firm in the year of 
acquisition. 
CEOAGE = Age of the CEO of the acquiring firm in the year of acquisition. 
 
All of the above variables are constructed for the acquiring firms. 
 
Dummy Variables 
FAM = One if the firm is a family firm and zero if it is a non-family firm. 
PUB= One if the target corporation is public and zero otherwise (non-public). 
DIVR = One if the acquirer and target are not in the same two-digit (four-digit) industry, else 
zero (focus increasing). 
SHR =One if the transaction is paid by stocks only, else zero (other payments). 
TO = One if the bid is a tender offer, else zero (Non-tender offer). 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Distribution of Single and Dual-Class IPOs 
 
This table provides the number of firms going public with single and dual-class of shares 
between 1990 and 2008. All the issues are from U.S. markets. The financial firms (SIC 6000-
6999), REITS, and issues with less than $5.00 issue prices are excluded. IPO year is the year of 
issue date. 
 
IPO Year Single-Class Dual-Class Total 
1990 99 6 105 
1991 238 20 258 
1992 349 17 366 
1993 427 28 455 
1994 336 28 364 
1995 381 26 407 
1996 556 55 611 
1997 374 36 410 
1998 220 24 244 
1999 390 31 421 
2000 318 19 337 
2001 61 6 67 
2002 47 9 56 
2003 43 6 49 
2004 135 11 146 
2005 111 16 127 
2006 128 6 134 
2007 127 12 139 
2008 16 3 19 
Total 4356(92.4%) 359(7.6%) 4715(100%) 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel B. 
 
This table provides the difference in mean test of some important variables used in empirical 
examination. SIZE is logarithm of the market value of equity of the firm in the year prior to the 
acquisition (in the case of the firm going public and making an acquisition in the same year, we 
use the market value of the same year). TOBINQ is the Tobin’s Q of the acquiring firm measured 
as the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of assets. VCBACKED is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm had VC backing before the IPO and zero otherwise. RDEALSIZE 
is the transaction value of the acquisition divided by the market value of equity of the firm in the 
year prior to the acquisition. RELATED is a dummy variable equal to one if both the acquirer and 
the target are in the same four-digit industry and zero otherwise. DEBTRATION is the total long-
term debt of the firm divided by the market value of equity of the firm. 
 
Variables 
Dual-
Class 
Single-
Class 
p-value 
Number of firms 113 1,266 
 
SIZE (in millions) 3,122.5 1,654.8 0.05 
TOBINQ 1.29 2.94 <0.001 
VCBACKED 0.26 0.51 <0.001 
RDEALSIZE 2.35 2.98 0.67 
RELATED 0.5 0.36 0.01 
DEBTRATIO 0.63 0.45 0.09 
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Table 2: Distribution of Acquirers 
 
Panel A provides the distribution and Chi-squared test of the method of payment in acquisitions 
by IPO firms. The columns with Year 0-3 list the acquisitions made within three years of going 
public, the columns with Year 0-4 list the acquisitions made within four years of going public, 
and the columns with Year 0-5 list the acquisitions made firms within five years of going public. 
The acquirers are the IPOs between 1990 and 2008 from Table 1, Panel A. CASH, HYBRID, and 
SHARES are the method of payment used in the acquisitions and are obtained from the SDC 
database. Similarly, Panel B provides the distribution and Chi-squared test of the types of 
acquisitions. The columns with Year 0-3 list the acquisitions made within three years of going 
public, the columns with Year 0-4 list the acquisitions made within four years of going public, 
and the columns with Year 0-5 list the acquisitions made firms within five years of going public. 
The acquirers are the IPOs between 1990 and 2008 from Table 1, Panel A. MERGER, ACQ 
ASSET, and OTHER are the merger, acquisition of assets, and other types of acquisitions, 
respectively. In both panels, we have included acquisitions from 1990 to 2012; thus, if the IPO 
year is 2008, the Year 0-5 column includes acquisitions within four years only for those 
particular IPOs. 
 
Panel A: Methods of payment for single and dual-class acquirers 
Method 
of 
Payment 
Year 0-3 Year 0-4 Year 0-5 
Single % Dual % Single % Dual % Single % Dual % 
CASH 724 35.6 96 51.9 890 36.7 126 55.0 1025 37.1 149 55.6 
HYBRID 582 28.6 54 29.2 669 27.6 62 27.1 758 27.4 70 26.1 
SHARES 728 35.8 35 18.9 865 35.7 41 17.9 982 35.5 49 18.3 
TOTAL 2,034 100.0 185 100.0 2,424 100.0 229 100.0 2765 100.0 268 100.0 
Chi-
Squared 
28.5 (<0.001) 41.3 (<0.001) 49.1 (<0.001) 
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Table 2: Distribution of Acquirers (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Distribution of types of acquisitions 
Types of 
Merger 
Year 0-3 Year 0-4 Year 0-5 
Single % Dual % Single % Dual % Single % Dual % 
MERGER 985 48.4 76 41.1 1189 49.1 89 38.9 1356 49.0 107 39.9 
ACQ ASSET 1031 50.7 108 58.4 1214 50.1 139 60.7 1382 50.0 158 59.0 
OTHER 18 0.9 1 0.5 21 0.8 1 0.4 27 1.0 3 0.1 
TOTAL 2,034 100.0 185 100.0 2,424 100.0 229 100.0 2765 100 268 100.0 
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Table 3: Method of Payment 
 
In Panel A, the dependent variable is STOCK, which is equal to one if the method of payment is 
STOCK and zero if the method of payment is CASH or HYBRID. The regression model is 
described in Section 4.2. The definitions of the control variables are provided in Appendix A. 
Acquisitions with all three types of methods of payment are included. In Panel B, we exclude 
acquisitions with HYBRID as a method of payment. 
 
Panel A: Acquirers including HYBRID method of payment 
 
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 
Variables Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
INTERCEPT 0.33 0.58 1.47 0.09 1.01 0.25 
DUAL -0.66*** 0.01 -0.90*** <.001 -0.86*** <.001 
SIZE -0.07 0.14 0.01 0.92 0.00 1.00 
TOBINQ 0.05*** <.001 0.04** 0.02 0.04** 0.02 
SLACK 0.99*** <.001 1.34*** <.001 1.40*** <.001 
CRISIS 1.00*** <.001 0.82*** 0.01 0.85*** <.001 
DEBTRATIO 0.21* 0.07 0.25** 0.05 0.25** 0.05 
INTCOV 0.01 0.88 -0.01 0.74 -0.01 0.71 
IPOPRO -0.08 0.15 -0.01 0.88 -0.01 0.94 
VCBACKED 0.46*** <.0001 0.45*** <.001 0.46*** <.001 
RDEALSIZE 0.01 0.63 0.01 0.29 0.00 0.31 
RELATED 0.10 0.42 0.03 0.85 0.02 0.88 
INNOA 
  
-0.50*** <.001 
  
INNOT 
    
-0.44*** 0.01 
CEOAGE 
  
-0.04*** <.0001 -0.04*** <.001 
TECH -0.71*** <.001 
    
TENDER -2.48*** <.001 -1.93*** 0.01 -1.97*** 0.01 
SUBS -0.57*** <.001 -0.83*** <.001 -0.82*** <.001 
ASSET -2.08*** <.001 -2.03*** <.001 -2.04*** <.001 
N 1,977 
  
1,185 
 
1,185 
R2 0.28 
  
0.30 
 
0.30 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Acquirers excluding HYBRID method of payment 
 
MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 
Variables Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
INTERCEPT 2.77*** 0.01 4.53*** 0.01 4.48 0.01 
DUAL -0.64** 0.03 -0.75*** 0.04 -0.72*** 0.05 
SIZE -0.13** 0.03 -0.11 0.17 -0.11 0.17 
TOBINQ 0.14** 0.04 0.07** 0.04 0.07** 0.04 
SLACK 1.20*** <.001 2.59*** <.001 2.59*** <.001 
CRISIS 0.60** 0.04 0.74* 0.06 0.80*** 0.051 
DEBTRATIO 0.23* 0.07 0.27** 0.05 0.26** 0.05 
INTCOV 0.01 0.55 -0.13 0.40 -0.13 0.40 
IPOPRO -0.16** 0.02 -0.16* 0.08 -0.14 0.11 
VCBACKED 0.70*** <.001 0.81*** <.001 0.89*** <.001 
RDEALSIZE -0.01 0.59 -0.01 0.37 -0.01 0.39 
RELATED 0.16 0.30 0.05 0.79 0.03 0.88 
INNOA 
  
-0.61*** 0.01 
  
INNOT 
    
-0.60*** 0.01 
CEOAGE 
  
-0.04*** 0.01 -0.04*** 0.01 
TECH -0.93*** <.001 
    
TENDER -3.92*** <.001 -3.94*** <.001 -3.98*** 0.01 
SUBS -1.40*** <.001 -2.33*** <.001 -2.32*** <.001 
ASSET -2.38*** <.001 -2.40*** <.001 -2.41*** <.001 
N 
 
1,408 
 
865 
 
865 
R2 
 
0.40 
 
0.44 
 
0.44 
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Table 4: Effect of Cash-Flow Right, Voting Right, and the Wedge on Method of Payment 
 
In Panel A, we test the effect of cash-flow rights (CFR) on the Choice of Method of Payment. 
The dependent variable is STOCK, which is equal to one if the method of payment is STOCK and 
zero if the method of payment is CASH. The logit regression model is described in Section 4.2. 
The definitions of the control variables are provided in Appendix A. Acquisitions with STOCK 
or CASH as the method of payment are included. In Panel B, we test the effect of voting rights 
(VOTER) on the Choice of Method of Payment. The dependent variable is STOCK, which is 
equal to one if the method of payment is STOCK and zero if the method of payment is CASH. 
The logit regression model is described in Section 4.2. The definitions of the control variables 
are provided in Appendix A. Acquisitions with STOCK or CASH as the method of payment are 
included. In Panel C, we test the effect of Wedge (WEDGE) on the Choice of Method of 
Payment. WEDGE is measured as the difference between voting rights and cash-flow rights. 
That is, WEDGE=VOTER-CFR. The dependent variable is STOCK, which is equal to one if the 
method of payment is STOCK and zero if the method of payment is CASH. The logit regression 
model is described in Section 4.2. The definitions of the control variables are provided in 
Appendix A. Acquisitions with STOCK or CASH as the method of payment are included. Panel 
D is similar to Panel C, but WEDGE is measured as the ratio of voting rights to cash-flow rights. 
 
Panel A: Effect of Cash-flow Rights (CFR) on the Choice of Method of Payment 
 
Year 0-3 Year 0-4 Year 0-5 
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
INTERCEPT 2.86 0.54 6.73* 0.07 9.08*** 0.01 
CFR 0.08 0.96 -0.98 0.51 -1.57 0.28 
SIZE -0.37 0.25 -0.51** 0.08 -0.67*** 0.01 
TOBINQ 
 
SLACK 
0.02 
 
-3.98** 
0.95 
 
0.06 
-0.06 
 
-3.71* 
0.85 
 
0.08 
0.04 
 
-4.27** 
0.89 
 
0.03 
 
CRISIS 1.51 0.12 0.56 0.44 0.38 0.64 
VCBACKED 2.93*** <0.001 2.38*** <0.001 2.40*** <0.001 
RELATED 0.13 0.88 -0.24 0.75 -0.06 0.94 
TECH -1.84* 0.07 -1.39 0.15 -1.86** 0.04 
SUBS -0.31 0.75 -1.41* 0.09 -1.39* 0.09 
 
N=88 
 
N=107 
 
N=118 
 
 
AdjR2=0.50 
 
AdjR2=0.44 
 
AdjR2=0.46 
 
 
  
 66 
 
Table 4  (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Effect of Voting Rights (VOTER) on the Choice of Method of Payment 
 
 
Year 0-3 Year 0-4 Year 0-5 
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
INTERCEPT 10.53 0.13 13.29** 0.02 14.90*** 0.01 
VOTER -3.16* 0.09 -3.75** 0.03 -4.02** 0.02 
SIZE -0.71 0.11 -0.81 0.03 -0.92 0.01 
TOBINQ 
 
SLACK 
-0.03 
 
-4.39** 
0.96 
 
0.05 
-0.05 
 
-4.61** 
0.89 
 
0.04 
0.02 
 
-5.00*** 
0.96 
 
0.02 
 
CRISIS 0.76 0.48 -0.04 0.96 0.20 0.80 
VCBACKED 2.67*** <0.001 2.25*** <0.001 2.37*** <0.001 
RELATED 0.33 0.71 0.18 0.82 0.37 0.64 
TECH -2.79** 0.03 -2.30* 0.06 -2.58** 0.03 
SUBS -0.70 0.45 -1.57* 0.06 -1.61* 0.06 
 
N=88 
 
N=107 
 
N=118 
 
 
AdjR2=0.49 
 
AdjR2=0.49 
 
AdjR2=0.51 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Effect of WEDGE on the Choice of Method of Payment 
Wedge= VOTER-CFR 
 
Year 0-3 Year 0-4 Year 0-5 
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
INTERCEPT 5.00 0.25 7.60 0.03 9.85 0.01 
WEDGE -3.90** 0.04 -3.48* 0.07 -3.79** 0.05 
SIZE -0.46 0.34 -0.56** 0.05 -0.74*** 0.01 
TOBINQ 
 
SLACK 
0.07 
 
-4.78** 
0.84 
 
0.03 
-0.01 
 
-4.61** 
0.97 
 
0.03 
0.11 
 
-5.27*** 
0.66 
 
0.01 
 
CRISIS 1.13 0.23 0.37 0.62 0.06 0.93 
VCBACKED 2.87*** <0.001 2.41*** <0.001 2.49*** <0.001 
RELATED 0.27 0.74 0.03 0.97 0.26 0.73 
TECH -1.87* 0.07 -1.40 0.15 -1.92** 0.04 
SUBS -0.18 0.83 -1.17 0.13 -1.07 0.15 
 
N=88 
 
N=107 
 
N=118 
 
 
AdjR2=0.50 
 
AdjR2=0.47 
 
AdjR2=0.48 
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Table 4 (Continued) 
  
 
Panel D: Effect of WEDGE on the Choice of Method of Payment 
WEDGE= VOTER/CFR 
 
Year 0-3 Year 0-4 Year 0-5 
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
INTERCEPT 3.71 0.33 6.41 0.04 9.02 0.01 
WEDGE -1.05** 0.04 -0.89** 0.05 -0.90* 0.08 
SIZE -0.30 0.30 -0.43* 0.08 -0.62*** 0.01 
TOBINQ 
 
SLACK 
0.06 
 
-5.35** 
0.86 
 
0.02 
-0.03 
 
-4.91 
0.90 
 
0.02 
0.12 
 
-5.60 
0.62 
 
0.01 
 
CRISIS 1.32 0.17 0.63 0.40 0.20 0.79 
VCBACKED 3.00*** 0.01 2.48*** <0.001 2.48*** <0.001 
RELATED 0.40 0.61 0.08 0.91 0.25 0.72 
TECH -1.60 0.11 -1.12 0.24 -1.81** 0.04 
SUBS -0.07 0.94 -1.10 0.15 -0.95 0.20 
 
N=88 
 
N=107 
 
N=118 
 
 
AdjR2=0.53 
 
AdjR2=0.50 
 
AdjR2=0.50 
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Table 5: Effect of High Low Wedge (HW) on the Choice of Method of Payment 
 
In Panels A, B, and C, the results are from the logit regression model. The dependent variable is 
STOCK, which is equal to one if the method of payment is STOCK and zero if the method of 
payment is CASH. The samples for Panels A, B, and C are acquisitions within three, four, and 
five years by dual-class IPOs, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Acquisitions within three years of going public (With Metrick data) 
(HW: 5%, 10%, 15%) 
 
Year 0-3 (5%) Year 0-3 (10%) Year 0-3 (15%) 
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
INTERCEPT 7.19 0.18 4.47 0.37 6.99 0.22 
HW -1.02 0.39 -2.84** 0.03 -4.72*** 0.01 
SIZE -0.62 0.14 -0.46 0.27 -0.58 0.19 
TOBINQ 
 
SLACK 
0.15 
 
-1.53 
0.73 
 
0.55 
0.15 
 
-0.13 
0.76 
 
0.97 
0.12 
 
1.27 
0.84 
 
0.71 
 
CRISIS 0.09 0.94 0.95 0.52 1.18 0.52 
VCBACKED 2.13 0.06 2.62 0.06 2.56 0.16 
RELATED 0.33 0.76 0.01 0.99 2.12 0.23 
TECH -2.73 0.07 -2.51 0.10 -5.63 0.01 
SUBS -0.87 0.36 -0.86 0.40 -1.14 0.41 
 
N=80 
 
N=80 
 
N=80 
 
 
AdjR2=0.44 
 
AdjR2=0.52 
 
AdjR2=0.62 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Acquisitions within four years of going public (With Metrick data) 
 
Year 0-4 (5%) Year 0-4 (10%) Year 0-4 (15%) 
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
INTERCEPT 9.00** 0.05 7.94* 0.07 9.76** 0.04 
HW -0.65 0.59 -1.86** 0.08 -2.97*** 0.01 
SIZE -0.70* 0.06 -0.62* 0.08 -0.63* 0.10 
TOBINQ 
 
SLACK 
0.10 
 
-2.07 
0.80 
 
0.41 
0.21 
 
-1.34 
0.60 
 
0.59 
0.17 
 
-0.04 
0.73 
 
0.99 
 
CRISIS -0.45 0.68 -0.26 0.81 -0.80 0.50 
VCBACKED 1.95* 0.06 1.92* 0.07 1.27 0.28 
RELATED 0.14 0.89 -0.08 0.94 0.77 0.53 
TECH -2.30 0.13 -2.12 0.15 -3.35* 0.06 
SUBS -1.57* 0.06 -1.51* 0.08 -2.22** 0.04 
 
N=99 
 
N=99 
 
N=99 
 
 
AdjR2=0.46 
 
AdjR2=0.50 
 
AdjR2=0.57 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Acquisitions within four years of going public (With Metrick data) 
(High Low wedge: 5%, 10%,15%)* 
 
Year 0-5 (5%) Year 0-5 (10%) Year 0-5 (15%) 
Variable Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
INTERCEPT 10.40*** 0.01 9.69*** 0.01 11.07*** 0.01 
HW -0.75 0.54 -1.84** 0.08 -3.06*** 0.01 
SIZE -0.81** 0.02 -0.75** 0.02 -0.73** 0.04 
TOBINQ 
 
SLACK 
0.20 
 
-2.12 
0.55 
 
0.40 
0.32 
 
-1.50 
0.38 
 
0.54 
0.26 
 
-0.08 
0.55 
 
0.98 
 
CRISIS -0.74 0.46 -0.64 0.51 -1.10 0.31 
VCBACKED 1.85* 0.07 1.77* 0.08 1.10 0.33 
RELATED 0.37 0.69 0.23 0.80 1.06 0.35 
TECH -2.78** 0.04 -2.74** 0.03 -3.85*** 0.01 
SUBS -1.49* 0.07 -1.37* 0.10 -2.13** 0.04 
 
N=110 
 
N=110 
 
N=110 
 
 
AdjR2=0.48 
 
AdjR2=0.52 
 
AdjR2=0.59 
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Table 6: Acquisition Tendency of Single and Dual-Class IPO Firms 
 
Panels A and B compare the acquisition activities of single and dual-class IPOs within the first 
two years of going public. In Panel A, we consider acquisitions with at least 1 million dollars of 
transaction value and 1% of the market capitalization. In Panel B, we consider any qualified 
acquisitions. In Panel C, we compare acquisitions in innovative industries (top one-third from 
Sevilir and Tian, 2012). 
 
 
Panel A: Acquisitions with at least 1 million dollars of transaction value and 1% of the market capitalization 
  
No. 
of 
Firms 
Acquiring  
Within First Year of IPO 
Acquiring Within Two Years of IPO 
IPO 
Type   
Acq 
Firms 
% 
Total 
M&As 
Ratio Acq Firms % 
Total 
M&As 
Ratio 
Single 
 
4,356 589 13.52 801 1.36 969 22.2 1506 1.55 
Dual 
 
359 47 13.09 59 1.26 83 23.1 125 1.51 
 
Total 4,715 636 13.49 860 1.35 1,052 22.3 1631 1.55 
 
Panel B: Any qualified acquisition 
  
No. of 
Firms 
Acquiring Within First Year of IPO Acquiring Within Two Years of IPO 
IPO 
Type   
Acq Firms % 
Total 
M&As 
Ratio Acq Firms % 
Total 
M&As 
Ratio 
Single 
 
4,356 1,098 25.20 1745 1.59 1,637 37.58 3191 1.95 
Dual 
 
359 91 25.34 157 1.73 144 40.11 322 2.23 
 
Total 4,715 1,189 25.22 1902 1.60 1,781 37.77 3513 1.97 
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Table 6 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Acquisition of innovative targets by single and dual-class IPO firms 
IPO 
Type 
No. of  
Firms 
Acquiring within first year of IPO Acquiring within two years of IPO 
Acq 
Firms 
Total 
M&As 
INNOT 
% 
INNOT 
Acq 
Firms 
Total 
M&As 
INNOT 
% 
INNOT 
Single 4,356 1,098 1,745 901 51.63 1,637 3,191 1,681 52.68 
Dual 359 91 157 88 56.05 144 322 196 60.87 
Total 4,715 1,189 1,902 989 52 1,781 3,513 1,877 53.43 
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Table 7: Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
 
In Panel A, the dependent variable is style-adjusted one-year BHAR. The sample of firms 
consists of single and dual-class acquirers making acquisitions within three years of going 
public. Targets in innovative industries are the targets in the top one-third of the industries in 
Table 1, Panel B of Sevilir and Tian’s (2012) paper, “Acquiring Innovation,” which is 
reproduced in Appendix B. 
 
Panel A: One year buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) 
Variable Coefficient 
p-
value 
Coefficient 
p-
value 
Coefficient 
p-
value 
Coefficient 
p-
value 
INTERCEPT -0.07 0.79 -0.08 0.76 -0.02 0.94 -0.11 0.69 
DUAL 0.13* 0.07 0.20* 0.06 -0.09 0.43 0.01 0.96 
DUAL_MOPC 
  
-0.13 0.36 
    
DUAL_INNOT 
    
0.39*** 0.01 
  
DUAL_INNOA 
      
0.19 0.18 
PUBTAR 0.01 0.91 0.01 0.92 0.01 0.91 -0.02 0.78 
SIZE -0.01 0.51 -0.01 0.5 -0.01 0.55 0.01 0.83 
TOBINQ 0.01 0.24 0.01 0.23 0.01 0.25 0.00 0.18 
VCBACKED 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.15 0.05 0.20 
RDEALSIZE 0.01 0.57 0.01 0.58 0.01 0.49 0.00 0.44 
RELATED 0.01 0.79 0.01 0.77 0.02 0.71 0.03 0.47 
DEBTRATIO 0.02 0.69 0.02 0.68 0.01 0.81 0.02 0.60 
TENDER 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.28 0.24 0.17 
ASSET -0.05 0.21 -0.06 0.2 -0.05 0.22 -0.05 0.26 
MOPC 0.03 0.46 0.05 0.33 0.03 0.45 0.03 0.56 
INNOT 0.02 0.68 0.02 0.68 -0.01 0.9 
  
INNOA 
      
-0.10 0.23 
INDUSTRY YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YEAR YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
R-squared 10.8 
 
10.86 
 
11.28 
 
11.17 
 
N 1,379 
 
1,379 
 
1,379 
 
1,379 
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Table 7 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Two year buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) 
Variable Coefficient 
p-
value 
Coefficient 
p-
value 
Coefficient 
p-
value 
Coefficient 
p-
value 
INTERCEPT -0.27 0.51 -0.29 0.48 -0.21 0.62 -0.26 0.52 
DUAL 0.27*** 0.01 0.40*** 0.01 0.01 0.99 0.07 0.67 
DUAL_MOPC 
  
-0.23 0.29 
    
DUAL_INNOT 
   
0.49** 0.03 
  
DUAL_INNOA 
     
0.36* 0.09 
PUBTAR -0.01 0.92 -0.01 0.91 -0.01 0.92 -0.03 0.77 
SIZE 0.01 0.67 0.01 0.68 0.01 0.63 0.01 0.53 
TOBINQ 0.01 0.85 0.01 0.87 0.01 0.84 0.00 0.96 
VCBACKED 0.18*** 0.01 0.18*** 0.01 0.19*** 0.01 0.19 0.00 
RDEALSIZE 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.12 0.01* 0.09 0.00 0.08 
RELATED 0.01 0.99 0.01 0.97 0.01 0.92 0.03 0.60 
DEBTRATIO -0.02 0.79 -0.02 0.81 -0.03 0.69 -0.02 0.80 
TENDER 0.3 0.25 0.31 0.24 0.26 0.32 0.31 0.24 
ASSET -0.1 0.11 -0.11 0.1 -0.1 0.12 -0.10 0.11 
MOPC 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.09 0.21 
INNOT -0.01 0.86 -0.01 0.86 -0.05 0.54 
  
INNOA 
      
-0.23 0.06 
INDUSTRY YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YEAR YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
R-squared 10.27 
 
10.35 
  
10.61 10.64 
 
N 1,379 
 
1,379 
 
1,379 
 
1379 
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Table 7 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Three year buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) 
Variable Coefficient 
p-
value 
Coefficient 
p-
value 
Coefficient 
p-
value 
Coefficient 
p-
value 
INTERCEPT -0.14 0.78 -0.15 0.76 -0.06 0.90 -0.15 0.76 
DUAL 0.29** 0.03 0.37** 0.05 -0.02 0.91 0.08 0.68 
DUAL_MOPC 
  
-0.16 0.52 
    
DUAL_INNOT 
    
0.55** 0.04 
  
DUAL_INNOA 
      
0.36 0.16 
PUBTAR -0.08 0.55 -0.08 0.54 -0.08 0.55 -0.11 0.41 
SIZE 0.02 0.38 0.02 0.38 0.02 0.35 0.02 0.24 
TOBINQ 0.01 0.75 0.01 0.76 0.01 0.74 0.00 0.89 
VCBACKED 0.18** 0.02 0.18** 0.02 0.19*** 0.01 0.18** 0.02 
RDEALSIZE 0 0.78 0 0.77 0.00 0.85 0.00 0.92 
RELATED 0.01 0.9 0.01 0.89 0.01 0.84 0.04 0.60 
DEBTRATIO -0.11 0.14 -0.11 0.15 -0.12 0.11 -0.11 0.16 
TENDER 0.41 0.19 0.42 0.19 0.37 0.24 0.43 0.17 
ASSET -0.18** 0.02 -0.18** 0.02 -0.18** 0.02 -0.17 0.03 
MOPC 0.25*** 0.01 0.26*** 0.01 0.25*** 0.01 0.22 0.01 
INNOT 0.01 0.9 0.01 0.9 -0.03 0.77 
  
INNOA 
      
-0.22 0.13 
INDUSTRY YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YEAR YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
R-squared 9.21 
 
9.24 
 
9.52 
 
9.30 
 
N 1,379 
 
1,379 
 
1,379 
 
1,379 
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Table 7 (Continued) 
 
Panel D: Four year buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) 
Variable Coefficient 
p-
value 
Coefficient 
p-
value 
Coefficient 
p-
value 
Coefficient 
p-
value 
INTERCEPT -0.62 0.23 -0.62 0.23 -0.59 0.25 -0.67 0.19 
DUAL 0.24* 0.09 0.28 0.17 -0.11 0.62 0.03 0.90 
DUAL_MOPC 
  
-0.08 0.78 
    
DUAL_INNOT 
    
0.59** 0.04 
  
DUAL_INNOA 
      
0.35 0.20 
PUBTAR -0.03 0.83 -0.03 0.83 -0.03 0.83 0.01 0.92 
SIZE 0.04* 0.07 0.04* 0.07 0.04* 0.06 0.05** 0.04 
TOBINQ 0.01 0.67 0.01 0.66 0.01 0.67 0.00 0.58 
VCBACKED 0.07 0.38 0.07 0.37 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.24 
RDEALSIZE 0.01 0.39 0.01 0.38 0.01 0.45 0.00 0.48 
RELATED -0.05 0.55 -0.05 0.56 -0.04 0.61 0.00 0.96 
DEBTRATIO -0.05 0.53 -0.05 0.53 -0.06 0.44 -0.06 0.48 
TENDER 0.3 0.35 0.3 0.35 0.25 0.43 0.25 0.44 
ASSET -0.12 0.15 -0.12 0.15 -0.12 0.16 -0.12 0.15 
MOPC 0.18** 0.04 0.19** 0.04 0.18** 0.04 0.17* 0.05 
INNOT 0.02 0.84 0.02 0.84 -0.02 0.83 
  
INNOA 
      
-0.16 0.30 
INDUSTRY YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YEAR YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
YES 
 
R-squared 8.2 
 
8.21 
 
8.52 
 
8.43 
 
N 1,346 
 
1,346 
 
1,346 
 
1,346 
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TABLE 8: Acquirers in First Year and Non-Acquirers in First Year 
 
The acquirers are the dual-class IPO firms acquiring within one-year of going public and the 
non-acquirers are dual-class IPOs that do not acquire within one-year of going public. BHAR is 
the style-adjusted buy-and-hold returns. Acquirers are the firms that acquire another firm within 
one year of going public and non-acquirers are those that do not acquire any firm within one year 
of going public. 
 
  
Dual-class 
  
Single-class 
 
 
Acquirers 
Non-
Acquirers 
Difference 
Test 
Acquirers 
Non-
Acquirers 
Difference 
Test 
 
N=82 N=233 p-value N=978 N=2849 p-value 
BHAR(0,1) 2.04 -6.56 0.25 5.96 0.01 0.03 
BHAR(0,2) 18.36 0.00 0.23 -1.11 -8.25 0.01 
BHAR(0,3) 11.68 -3.14 0.40 -15.16 -2.73 0.01 
BHAR(0,4) 14.95 -4.31 0.39 -24.21 -4.72 0.01 
BHAR(1,2) 12.8 2.04 0.23 -11.61 4.14 0.01 
BHAR(1,3) 11.6 -2.85 0.24 -7.14 0.15 0.01 
BHAR(1,4) 6.55 0.05 0.70 -15.57 2.97 0.01 
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Table 9: Distribution of Family and Non-Family Firms by Years and Industries 
 
Panel A provides the frequency distribution of non-family and family acquirers by year of the 
effective date of acquisition. Only the first acquisition (satisfying all screening criterion) within 
three years is taken into consideration. Percentage is the percentage of family firms in the given 
year out of total acquisitions. Panel B provides the distribution of 213 acquisitions by the 
industry of the acquirers. Industry classification is based on Fama -French 48 industries. 
 
Panel A: By Years 
Year Non-family Acquirers 
Family 
Acquirers 
Total Percentage 
1993 6 3 9 33.33 
1994 12 6 18 33.33 
1995 11 5 16 31.25 
1996 15 6 21 28.57 
1997 21 7 28 25.00 
1998 10 6 16 37.50 
1999 27 9 36 25.00 
2000 12 6 18 33.33 
2001 8 3 11 27.27 
2002 1 7 8 87.50 
2003 6 3 9 33.33 
2004 8 4 12 33.33 
2005 7 1 8 12.50 
2006 2 1 3 33.33 
Total 146 67 213 31.46 
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Table 9 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: By Industries 
Industry 
Non-Family 
Frequency 
Family 
frequency 
Total Percentage 
Food Products 4 3 7 3.29 
Candy & Soda 1 0 1 0.47 
Beer & Liquor 0 1 1 0.47 
Recreation 3 2 5 2.35 
Printing and Publishing 4 5 9 4.23 
Consumer Goods 6 4 10 4.69 
Apparel 1 2 3 1.41 
Healthcare 1 0 1 0.47 
Medical Equipment 11 1 12 5.63 
Pharmaceutical Products 16 2 18 8.45 
Chemicals 5 2 7 3.29 
Rubber and Plastic Products 0 1 1 0.47 
Textiles 0 1 1 0.47 
Construction Materials 7 0 7 3.29 
Steel Works Etc 3 2 5 2.35 
Machinery 6 5 11 5.16 
Electrical Equipment 2 0 2 0.94 
Automobiles and Trucks 2 2 4 1.88 
Aircraft 5 0 5 2.35 
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 0 3 3 1.41 
Defense 3 0 3 1.41 
Precious Metals 1 0 1 0.47 
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 2 0 2 0.94 
Petroleum and Natural Gas 10 1 11 5.16 
Personal Services 0 1 1 0.47 
Business Services 8 8 16 7.51 
Computers 10 6 16 7.51 
Electronic Equipment 10 5 15 7.04 
Measuring and Control Equipment 3 0 3 1.41 
Business Supplies 8 0 8 3.76 
Wholesale 2 0 2 0.94 
Retail 11 6 17 7.98 
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 1 4 5 2.35 
Total 146 67 213 100 
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Table 10: Summary Statistics  
 
Panel A of this table provides the summary statistics of the variables used in the regression 
specifications. The definition of the variables and their units are provided in Appendix C. Panel 
B provides the number of observations for both categories of the dummy variables used in the 
study. The details of the dummies are also provided in Appendix C. Transaction value (TVAL) 
and Market value (MVL) are expressed in millions of dollars. 
Panel A 
Variable Family Non-family Difference test 
Transaction Value ( TVAL) 752 2342.6 0.09 
Transaction Value/Asset (TVAT) 0.54 0.56 0.93 
Market Value (MVL) 17,967.2 23,037.2 0.33 
Log(Market Value) (LMVL) 15.72 16.01 0.16 
Return on Asset (ROA) 0.34 0.32 0.60 
Cash holding  (CHLD) 0.36 0.21 0.00 
Insti Ownership (INSOWN) 
Age of the CEO (CEOAGE) 
0.53 
56.54% 
54 
0.49 
66.35% 
55 
0.66 
< 0.001 
0.91 
Panel B: 
Dummy Variables Categories Family Non-family 
  
Number Percentage Number Percentage 
Public target (PUB) 
Public 27 40.30 40 27.40 
Non-public 40 59.70 106 72.60 
Diversifying (DIVR) 
Focus Increasing 28 41.79 76 52.05 
Non-focus Increasing 39 52.21 70 47.97 
Share (SHR) 
Share Payment 18 26.87 44 30.14 
Other payments 49 73.13 102 69.86 
Tender Offer (TO) 
Tender Offer 17 25.37 30 20.55 
Non-Tender Offer 50 74.63 116 79.45 
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Table 11: Correlation Matrix 
 
This table reports the correlation coefficients for the key variables used in the regressions. 
TVAL= Deal value (in millions) of the merger from SDC. TVAT= TVAT/Total Assets. MVAL= 
(closing price of the stock in the last trading day of the month before the effective date of the 
merger)*Number of shares outstanding. LMVL= Common logarithm of MVAL. ROA= 
operating income before depreciation/Total Assets. MB = (MVAL +Book value of equity)/Total 
Assets. CHLD = Cash and Short-term investments/Total Assets. LTD = Total long-term 
debt/Total Assets, INSOWN = institutional ownership in the acquiring firm in the year of 
acquisition, and CEOAGE = Age of the CEO of the acquiring firm in the year of acquisition. All 
of the above variables are constructed for the acquiring firms. PUB is equal to one if the target 
firm is public, zero otherwise (non-public). DIVR is equal to one if the acquirer and target are 
not in the same two-digit industry, and zero otherwise (Non-focus increasing). SHR is equal to 
one if the transaction is paid by stocks only and is zero otherwise (other payments). TO is equal 
to one if the bid is a tender offer and zero otherwise (Non-tender offer). HI is equal to one if the 
deal is classified as Hi-tech in SDC and zero otherwise (Non Hi-Tech). 
 
Variables LMVL FAM TVAT PUB SHR ROA DIVR CHLD TO INSOWN CEOAGE 
LMVL 1.00           
FAM -0.11 1.00          
TVAT -0.10 -0.01 1.00         
PUB 0.11 -0.12 0.23 1.00        
SHR 0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.09 1.00       
ROA 0.27 0.03 0.20 0.05 0.02 1.00      
DIVR 0.17 -0.12 -0.22 0.01 -0.11 -0.17 1.00     
CHLD 0.06 0.18 -0.16 -0.07 0.12 -0.14 -0.18 1.00    
TO -0.05 0.03 -0.08 0.37 -0.31 0.01 0.14 -0.03 1.00   
INSOWN -0.18 -0.32 -0.01 0.11 0.03 -0.12 -0.02 -0.10 -0.05 1.00 
 
CEOAGE 0.04 0.01 0.11 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 0.04 -0.09 0.03 0.03 1.00 
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Table 12: Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns 
 
This table presents the coefficients and the p-values for the independent variables used to explain 
the buy-and hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for the combined samples of family and non-family 
acquirers. The dependent variable is BHAR for the 12 months (for Panel A) and 36 months (for 
Panel B) after the month of the effective date of the acquisition and the variable of interest is the 
dummy variable FAM, which is equal to one if the acquirer is a family firm in that year and zero 
otherwise. Style-adjusted return uses the returns of the 25 size and book-to-market portfolios as 
the benchmark return and market-adjusted return uses the value-weighted market return for that 
month. The definition of other variables can be obtained in Appendix C. 
 
Panel A: 1-year Buy and hold abnormal returns 
Dependent variable: 1-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
Variable 
Style-adjusted Market Adjusted 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept -89.69 0.11 -74.88 0.14 
FAM 17.95 0.02 15.28 0.05 
LMVL 2.59 0.38 2.07 0.50 
TVAT 1.97 0.55 2.66 0.44 
PUB -13.10 0.09 -11.10 0.16 
SHR -5.17 0.48 -2.10 0.78 
ROA -2.27 0.90 6.35 0.73 
DIVR 8.55 0.22 8.63 0.23 
CHLD -7.21 0.49 -8.39 0.44 
TO -0.66 0.94 6.54 0.49 
INSOWN 2.72 0.91 -4.68 0.85 
CEOAGE 0.23 0.43 0.11 0.70 
Year Fixed Effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Industry fixed Effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
R2 18.09% 
 
15.34% 
 
N 213 
 
213 
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Table 12: Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns 
 
Panel B: 3-year Buy and hold abnormal returns 
Dependent variable: 3-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
Variable 
Style-adjusted Market Adjusted 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept -115.63 0.33 -9.83 0.93 
FAM 39.56 0.04 35.55 0.07 
LMVL -1.24 0.86 -5.98 0.41 
TVAT 9.18 0.26 11.67 0.16 
PUB -32.46 0.08 -30.49 0.10 
SHR -22.50 0.20 -13.94 0.44 
ROA -8.21 0.85 -9.36 0.83 
DIVR 33.41 0.05 26.17 0.12 
CHLD 12.33 0.63 3.91 0.88 
TO -24.42 0.27 -7.15 0.75 
INSOWN 13.55 0.82 -7.74 0.90 
CEOAGE 0.64 0.36 0.16 0.82 
Year Fixed Effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Industry fixed Effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
R2 
N 
18.42% 
207  
14.22% 
207  
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Table 13: Calendar Time Portfolio Regressions 
 
This table reports the results from the four- and five-factor calendar time portfolio regression as 
specified in Equations (A) and (B) in Section 3.2. Intercept is the mean monthly return on the 
calendar time portfolio given by ARt; MKT is Rmt − rft, which is the abnormal return on the 
value-weighted market index; SMB is the monthly difference in the returns of a value-weighted 
portfolio of small and big stocks; HML is the monthly difference in the returns of a value-
weighted portfolio of high book-to-market; UMD is the monthly difference in the returns of a 
value-weighted portfolio of past winner stocks and past loser stocks; and LIQ is the value-
weighted return on the 10-1 portfolio from a sort on historical liquidity betas, as defined in 
Robert F. Stambaugh’s website. 
 
Panel A: Calendar time four factor model regression 
Variable 
Non-Family Acquirers Family Acquirers 
Estimate t-value p-value Estimate t-value p-value 
Intercept 0.21 1.15 0.251 0.75 2.35 0.0204 
MKT 0.80 18.65 <.0001 0.97 12.7 <.0001 
SMB -0.34 -6.56 <.0001 -0.03 -0.28 0.7835 
HML -0.05 -0.89 0.3757 -0.4 -3.95 0.0001 
UMD -0.10 -3.09 0.0023 -0.32 -5.34 <.0001 
Number of months 190 190 
Adjusted R-squared 72.49% 64.17% 
Panel B: Calendar time five factor model regression 
Variable 
Non-Family Acquirers Family Acquirers 
Estimate t-value p-value Estimate t-value p-value 
Intercept 0.25 1.40 0.1629 0.69 1.98 0.0493 
MKT 0.78 15.92 <.0001 1.01 10.49 <.0001 
SMB -0.32 -6.45 <.0001 -0.01 -0.09 0.925 
HML -0.07 -1.12 0.2664 -0.38 -3.03 0.0028 
UMD -0.13 -3.90 0.0001 -0.38 -5.65 <.0001 
LIQ 0.06 1.25 0.2139 0.07 0.77 0.4424 
Number of months 178 178 
Adjusted R-squared 72.67% 62.71% 
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Table 14: Diversifying and Non-diversifying Acquisitions 
 
In Panel A, the dependent variables are style-adjusted and market adjusted one-year BHARs. In 
Panel B, the dependent variables are style-adjusted and market adjusted t-year BHARs. FAM is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the firm is a family firm and zero otherwise. DIVR is a dummy 
variable equal to one if acquirers and targets are not in the same two-digit SIC industry. 
 
Panel A: 1-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
Dependent variable: 1-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
Variable 
Style-Adjusted Market Adjusted 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept -70.63 0.15 -54.84 0.28 
FAM 5.80 0.58 2.50 0.82 
FAM_DIVR 26.35 0.07 27.72 0.07 
LMVL 2.08 0.48 1.53 0.61 
TVAT 1.75 0.60 2.44 0.48 
PUB -10.80 0.10 -8.68 0.21 
SHR -5.41 0.45 -2.36 0.75 
ROA -0.14 0.99 8.59 0.64 
DIVR 0.94 0.91 0.62 0.94 
CHLD -9.61 0.36 -10.91 0.31 
TO -1.15 0.90 6.03 0.52 
INSOWN -1.35 0.96 -8.97 0.72 
CEOAGE 0.23 0.43 0.11 0.70 
Year Fixed Effect 
 
Industry Fixed Effect 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
R2 
N 
19.09% 
213  
18.37% 
213  
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Table 14 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: 3-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
Dependent variable: 3-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
Variable 
Style-adjusted Market Adjusted 
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
Intercept -107.21 0.41 1.33 0.99 
FAM 9.27 0.69 8.32 0.72 
FAM_DIVR 58.87 0.06 54.62 0.08 
LMVL -0.24 0.97 -5.52 0.45 
TVAT 5.68 0.50 8.94 0.30 
PUB -29.48 0.09 -27.31 0.10 
SHR -22.28 0.21 -13.94 0.44 
ROA -18.53 0.68 -16.25 0.72 
DIVR 9.87 0.56 8.60 0.61 
CHLD 4.71 0.85 -2.14 0.93 
TO -22.25 0.31 -6.04 0.79 
INSOWN 0.85 0.99 -18.93 0.75 
CEOAGE 0.65 0.35 0.16 0.82 
Year Fixed Effect 
 
Industry Fixed Effect 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
R2 
N 
19.44% 
207  
16.77% 
207  
 
